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I. INTRODUCTION
Although people enter into bailment agreements every day, the di-
versity and significance of bailments generally are unknown to lay per-
sons and ignored by lawyers. This neglect stems in part from the
antiquity of bailment and from its overlap with other branches of the
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law.' One commentator has stated that "bailment stands at the point at
which contract, tort, and property law converge," representing a con-
tractual conveyance of personal property that is enforceable in tort.
2
Although bailment draws from other areas of the law, it retains a sepa-
rate legal personality whose independent character has yet to be fully
explored.
The term "bailment," commonly defined as "the rightful possession
of goods by one who is not the owner,"3 is derived from the French verb
bailler, which means "to deliver."'4 The elements required to create
most bailments include the intent to establish a bailment relationship,
the bailor's delivery of the property to the bailee, and the bailee's ac-
ceptance of the item.5 In order for a valid bailment to arise, the bailee
must obtain possession of the bailed property. If the bailee fails to take
possession, no bailment exists, and none of the rights and obligations
incident to a bailment are established." Possession in the bailment con-
text consists of two elements: the bailee's exercise of physical control
over the bailed property and the bailee's intent to exercise physical con-
trol.7 Many items may be balled-some ordinary, such as cars,S film,9
and laundry,'0 and others rather unusual, such as prunes" and dead
1. N. PALMER, BAILMENT 1 (1979).
2. Id.
3. 9 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1030, at 875 (3d ed. 1967). For a
case adopting Professor Williston's definition, see Zuppa v. Hertz Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 419, 423,
268 A.2d 364, 366 (1970). See generally R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 10.1 (3d ed.
1975).
4. See M. Bruenger & Co. v. Dodge City Truck Stop, Inc., 234 Kan. 682, 685, 675 P.2d 864,
868 (1984); see also J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 2 (7th ed. 1863).
5. See, e.g., Wright v. Autohaus Fortense, Inc., 129 Ill. App. 3d 422, 424-25, 472 N.E.2d 593,
595 (1984); Allright Auto Parks, Inc. v. Moore, 560 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). But see
infra notes 33-35. See generally R. BROWN, supra note 3, §§ 10.2-10.3.
6. R. BROWN, supra note 3, § 10.2.
7. Id.; see also Farmer v. Machine Craft, Inc., 406 So. 2d 981, 982-83 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981);
Morris v. Hamilton, 225 Va. 372, 374-75, 302 S.E.2d 51, 52-53 (1983).
8. See, e.g., Davidson v. Ramsby, 133 Ga. App. 128, 210 S.E.2d 245 (1974); Chambers v.
Morgan, 671 P.2d 89 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983); Savoy Hotel Corp. v. Sparks, 57 Tenn. App. 537, 421
S.W.2d 98 (1967); Allright, Inc. v. Schroeder, 551 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). But see Gar-
lock v. Multiple Parking Servs., Inc., 103 Misc. 2d 943, 427 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Buffalo City Ct. 1980)
(holding that the "bailment theory" as a basis for recovery in parking lot cases is no longer appro-
priate). See generally Annotation, Liability for Loss of Automobile Left at Parking Lot or Garage,
13 A.L.R.4th 362 (1982); Annotation, Liability of Owner or Operator of Parking Lot or Garage for
Loss of or Damage to Contents of Parked Motor Vehicle, 78 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1977).
9. See, e.g., Carr v. Hoosier Photo Supplies, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. 1982); Bowes v. Fox-
Stanley Photo Prods., 379 So. 2d 844 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d
40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1970). See generally Annotation, Liability of One Undertaking to Develop or to
Otherwise Process Already Developed Photographic Film for Its Loss or Destruction, 6 A.L.R.4th
934 (1981).
10. See, e.g., Holder v. Lockwood, 92 So. 2d 768 (La. Ct. App. 1957); Brooks v. Angelo's
Cleaners, 103 A.D.2d 923, 477 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1984). See generally Annotation, Liability of Laun-
19881 COMMERCIAL BAILMENTS
bodies.12 The bailment concept, however, is limited to tangible personal
property"3 and generally does not extend to either real or intangible
property. 4
Before finalizing a bailment contract, a bailee often insists that a
stipulation relieving it of liability for negligent loss of or damage to
property under the bailee's control be included in the agreement. In
England, an ordinary bailee normally is permitted to limit contractually
its liability for negligence.1 5 English courts uphold these exculpatory
provisions both as valid exercises of the freedom to contract without
interference and as devices for shifting the burden of obtaining insur-
ance.'" In the United States, however, the issue of whether a bailee may
limit its liability for negligence has not developed uniformly. 7 Although
a bailee may incorporate an exculpatory clause into the bailment con-
tract, the limitation of liability may not be enforced in every
jurisdiction.'
In 1907 Professor Willis, while studying the ability of bailees to
limit by contract their liability for negligence, found that American law
on this topic had not yet crystallized. Nonetheless, he predicted that
dry, Clothes Presser, Dyer, or Dry Cleaner or Third Person by Whom the Work Is Actually Done,
for Loss of or Damage to Customer's Goods, 130 A.L.R. 1359 (1941).
11. See Dalk v. Lachmund, 157 Or. 152, 70 P.2d 558 (1937) (holding prune dryer to be bailee-
for-hire).
12. See Edwards v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 390, 286 S.W.2d 157 (1956). For a discussion of
bailments of corpses and human tissue, see generally N. PALMER, supra note 1, at 7-10.
13. See National Ben Franklin Ins. Co. v. Bakhaus Contractors, Inc., 124 Mich. App. 510, 335
N.W.2d 70 (1983) (noting that only personal property can be the subject of a bailment). See gener-
ally N. PALMER, supra note 1, at 6.
14. See N. PALMER, supra note 1, at 6. But see People v. Smith, 155 Cal. App. 3d 1103, 203
Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984) (bailment of stock), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); Robinson v. St. Clair
County, 144 Ill. App. 3d 118, 493 N.E.2d 1154 (1986) (bailment of intangible); In re Crabtree, 48
Bankr. 528 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (bailment of debenture and stock certificate). It may be
possible to reconcile the cases permitting the bailment of stocks with those prohibiting the bail-
ment of stocks by distinguishing between the intangible interest (ownership interest in company)
and the physical object (stock certificate) representing that interest.
15. As early as 1815 Lord Ellenborough, in Maving v. Todd, 4 Campb. 225, 171 Eng. Rep. 72
(K.B. 1815), held that a provision in a bailment contract limiting liability for loss by fire was valid
and relieved the bailee from responsibility for any fire damage regardless of the cause. The receipt
that the defendants gave the plaintiff stated, "Not accountable for loss by fire." Lord Ellenborough
declared, "I am . . . of [the] opinion that a [bailee] by such a notice may entirely get rid of his
liability for loss by fire." Id. (emphasis added).
16. See Note, Validity of an Ordinary Bailment Contract Limiting Liability of Bailee for
Negligence, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 772, 773 (1938). For a discussion of insurance in the bailment con-
text, see Part V of this Note.
17. See infra note 22. But see . BROWN, supra note 3, § 11.5 (stating that "it is well settled
that the parties may agree among themselves, by any contract which is not contrary to public
policy, as to the extent of the bailee's liability. Such contracts may impose either a lesser or a
greater responsibility on the [bailee] than the law ordinarily implies").
18. See infra note 22.
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the trend in American courts would be to uphold, on the basis of free-
dom of contract, any exculpation not contrary to public policy. 9 Not all
scholars agreed with Willis' conclusion. At least one commentator chal-
lenged this prognosis20 by revealing a wide split of authority among
and, in a few instances, within, jurisdictions.2' This lack of consensus
still exists.2
19. Willis, The Right of Bailees to Contract Against Liability for Negligence, 20 HARV. L.
REv. 297, 299-304 (1907). Willis stated:
I maintain that ... parties should be allowed freedom of contract. . . and thus contract for
exemption from liability for negligence if they desire. Of course, if there is any rule of public
policy that would be violated, this should not be allowed.. . . It is true that [some contracts]
might be. . . bad. . . for one of the parties, but. .. [p]ublic policy does not yet forbid bad
bargains.
Id. at 301.
20. See, e.g., Note, supra note 16.
21. See id. at 773-75.
22. Courts in the following states either have enforced a clause limiting a bailee's liability for
negligence or have inferred that they would enforce such a clause if presented with the issue:
ALABAMA: See Birmingham Television Corp. v. Water Works, 292 Ala. 147, 290 So. 2d 635
(1974).
CONNECTICUT: See Carter v. Reichlin Furriers, 34 Conn. Supp. 661, 386 A.2d 647 (1977) (hold-
ing that a bailee may not limit liability entirely).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: See Bernstein v. Noble, 487 A.2d 231, 234 (D.C. 1985) (stating that
an exculpatory clause will "serve to limit liability to only those acts of gross negligence, willful acts,
or fraud"); Houston v. Security Storage Co., 474 A.2d 143 (D.C. 1984) (upholding a valuation
clause when the bailor had actual notice).
FLORIDA: See FDIC v. Carre, 436 So. 2d 227, 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that exculpa-
tory clauses are disfavored but are upheld when "clear and unequivocal"); cf. Harbor One, Inc. v.
Preston, 172 So. 2d 478 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (disallowing a limitation of liability because
ambiguity resolved against the drafter-bailee).
ILLINOIS: See Blume v. Evans Fur Co., 126 Ill. App. 3d 52, 466 N.E.2d 1366 (1984).
LOUISIANA: See Grabert v. James C. Noel Flying Serv., Inc., 360 So. 2d 1363 (La. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that the bailor must have actual knowledge of the limitation); cf. Bowes v. Fox-Stanley
Photo Prods., Inc., 379 So. 2d 844 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (indicating that a disclaimer limiting liabil-
ity is not binding absent a showing that it was explained or brought to the bailor's attention). For
a discussion of Bowes, see infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
MICHIGAN: See Klann v. Hess Cartage Co., 50 Mich. App. 703, 214 N.W.2d 63 (1973) (allowing a
bailee to limit liability for ordinary negligence but not gross negligence).
MISSISSIPPI: See Van Noy Interstate Co. v. Tucker, 125 Miss. 260, 87 So. 643 (1921).
MISSOURI: See Wells v. Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 39 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931); cf. Nuell
v. Forty-North Corp., 358 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962) (refusing to enforce limitation of liability
because the bailor did not have actual notice of the posted signs or the disclaimer on receipt).
MONTANA: See Jones v. Great N. Ry., 68 Mont. 231, 217 P. 673 (1923).
NEW JERSEY: See Lebkeucher v. Pennsylvania Ry., 97 N.J.L. 112, 116 A. 323 (1922), aff'd, 98
N.J.L. 271, 118 A. 926 (1922).
NEW MEXICO: See Omni Aviation Managers, Inc. v. Buckley, 97 N.M. 477, 641 P.2d 508 (1982).
NORTH CAROLINA: See Miller's Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E.2d 341
(1951) (allowing limitation of liability when no disparity of bargaining power exists).
SOUTH CAROLINA: See Marlow v. Conway Iron Works, 130 S.C. 256, 125 S.E. 569 (1924).
TENNESSEE: See Savoy Hotel Corp. v. Sparks, 57 Tenn. App. 537, 421 S.W.2d 98 (1967).
TEXAS: See Fowler v. One Seguin Art Center, 617 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (permitting a
bailee to limit liability for ordinary but not gross negligence); Allright, Inc. v. Schroeder, 551
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The arguments for and against limitations of a bailee's liability for
S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). For a discussion of Fowler, see infra notes 92-96 and accompa-
nying text.
VERMONT: See Goslant v. Town of Calais, 90 Vt. 114, 96 A. 751 (1916).
VIRGINIA: See Revenue Aero Club, Inc. v. Alexandria Airport, Inc., 192 Va. 231, 64 S.E.2d 671
(1951).
WYOMING: See Fuchs v. Goe, 62 Wyo. 134, 163 P.2d 783 (1945) (requiring that exculpatory
clause be specific and clearly expressed).
Eight jurisdictions have held that limitations of liability for negligence are invalid or have
indicated that exculpatory clauses are strongly disfavoied.
ARIZONA: Cf. Lerner v. Brettschneider, 123 Ariz. 152, 598 P.2d 515 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (striking
down limitation of liability because it was inconspicuous).
ARKANSAS: See Missouri P. Ry. v. Fugua, 150 Ark. 145, 233 S.W. 926 (1921).
COLORADO: See Parris v. Jaquith, 70 Colo. 63, 197 P. 750 (1920).
KENTUCKY: See Parkrite Auto Park, Inc. v. Badgett, 242 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1951) (indicating that
disclaimer on a parking receipt was not sufficient to limit liability).
MINNESOTA: See Hoel v. Flour City Fuel & Transfer Co., 144 Minn. 280, 175 N.W. 300 (1919).
NEBRASKA: See Peck v. Masonic Manor Apartment Hotel, 203 Neb. 308, 278 N.W.2d 589 (1979)
(holding that a bailee's right to limit his liability by contract does not extend to an exemption from
the consequences of his own negligence). For a discussion of Peck, see infra notes 97-101 and
accompanying text.
OKLAHOMA: See Fisk v. Bullard, 205 Okla. 502, 239 P.2d 424 (1951) (stating that contracts limit-
ing a bailee's liability for negligence during his course of dealing with the public usually are void as
against public policy).
OREGON: See Real Good Food Store, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 276 Or. 1057, 557 P.2d 654 (1976);
Pilson v. Tip-Top Auto Co., 67 Or. 528, 136 P. 642 (1913).
Conflict exists within the following jurisdictions:
CALIFORNIA: Compare Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n v. Pacific Wharf & Storage Co., 187 Cal.
38, 200 P. 934 (1921) (allowing limitation) with Dieterle v. Bekin, 143 Cal. 683, 77 P. 664 (1904)
(prohibiting limitation).
GEORGIA: Compare Hall v. Gardens Servs., Inc., 174 Ga. App. 856, 332 S.E.2d 3 (1985) (allowing
limitation) with Davidson v. Ramsby, 133 Ga. App. 128, 210 S.E.2d 245 (1974) (holding that a
disclaimer on a parking garage ticket ineffective to limit liability for negligence). This split of
authority may exist only between disclaimers printed on the backs of receipts and all other types
of limitations.
INDIANA: Compare Carr v. Hoosier Photo Supplies, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. 1982) (allowing
limitation) with System Auto Parks & Garages, Inc. v. American Economy Ins. Co., 411 N.E.2d 163
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (prohibiting limitation). For a discussion of Carr, see infra notes 144-56 and
accompanying text.
MASSACHUSETTS: Compare D'Alosio v. Morton's, Inc., 342 Mass. 231, 172 N.E.2d 819 (1961)
(allowing exculpatory clause even though the bailor did not understand the text of the disclaimer
because she spoke and read little English) with Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Captain Fowler's
Marina, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 347 (D. Mass. 1971) (prohibiting limitation on public policy grounds).
NEW YORK: Compare Brooks v. Angelo's Cleaners, 103 A.D.2d 923, 477 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1984)
(holding that the limitation was ineffective as against the bailor) with Goldbaum v. Bank Leumi
Trust Co., 543 F. Supp. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that the parties are free to limit expressly the
bailee's common law liability).
OHIO: Compare Kayanda v. Kamenir, 16 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 475 N.E.2d 519 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1984)
and Edwards v. Crestmont Cadillac Corp., 64 Ohio Misc. 1, 410 N.E.2d 815 (1979) (indicating that
public policy generally will not permit bailee to exempt himself from liability for his own negli-
gence or that of his agents) with Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. F.Z. Cikra, Inc., 58 Ohio L. Abs. 66,
95 N.E.2d 230 (1950) (allowing limitation of liability if not against public policy), rev'd in part, 155
Ohio St. 421, 99 N.E.2d 81 (1951).
PENNSYLVANIA: Compare Zimmer v. Mitchell & Ness, 235 Pa. Super. 474, 385 A.2d 437 (1978)
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negligence are simple and straightforward. Critics argue that exculpa-
tory clauses violate public policy2" and encourage negligence. 24 Support-
ers of these limitations respond that the pressures of competitive
business will discourage most negligent tendencies 25 and also indicate
that the potential harm caused by exculpatory clauses must be bal-
anced with the equally important notion of freedom to contract.2 The
methods bailees use to limit or exempt liability for negligence, which
also are elemental, include express clauses in contracts, 27 statutory pro-
visions, 28 printed disclaimers on receipts,29 and posted warning signs.30
This Note examines the use and ramifications of exculpatory
clauses for negligence in bailment agreements. Part II of this Note out-
lines the history and current status of the commercial bailee's duty of
care. Part III discusses several techniques that bailees use to limit their
liability for negligence. Part IV discusses the feasibility of applying cer-
tain sections of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or
Code) to bailment transactions. Finally, Part V suggests that the pro-
curement of insurance may protect bailors from the financial loss that
(allowing limitation), afl'd, 490 Pa. 428, 416 A.2d 1010 (1980) with Atkins v. Racquet Garage Corp.,
177 Pa. Super. 94, 110 A.2d 767 (1955) (asserting that a bailee cannot stipulate against liability for
his own negligence).
WASHINGTON: Compare S.S. Kresge Co. v. Port of Longview, 18 Wash. App. 805, 573 P.2d 1336
(1977) (prohibiting limitation) with Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308
(1979) (allowing limitation). For a discussion of Mieske, see infra notes 194-215 and accompanying
text.
Courts in Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have not addressed the question of
whether a commercial bailee may limit its liability for negligence.
The preceding categorization is complicated by the fact that some courts (1) will enforce ex-
culpatory clauses generally but will refuse to do so under certain circumstances, see supra cases for
Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, and North Carolina; (2) have allowed bailees to limit liability for one
degree of negligence but not another, see supra cases for District of Columbia, Michigan, and
Texas; or (3) have not addressed the issue in several decades and conceivably would switch posi-
tions if presented with the opportunity, see, e.g., supra cases for Arkansas, Colorado, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wyoming.
23. See, e.g., supra note 20 (Massachusetts, Ohio, and Oklahoma cases).
24. See, e.g., Note, supra note 16, at 776 n.46
One commentator has suggested that limitations of liability for negligence should be invali-
dated because the party receiving the release might become lazy as a result of its secure position.
This laxity enhances the likelihood that negligent loss of or damage to the bailed property will
occur. The possibility of pecuniary loss encourages a party to exercise greater care in its dealings
with others. See Comment, Contracting Against Liability for Negligent Conduct, 4 Mo. L. REV. 55,
56 (1939).
25. Id. at 777.
26. Id.
27. See infra notes 58-101 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 106-39 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 140-67 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 167-86 and accompanying text.
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can result from a bailee's negligence.
II. THE BAILEE'S DUTY OF CARE
A. Historical Development
For centuries, scholars and judges have struggled to develop a
framework within which to analyze bailment agreements. Modern bail-
ment law originated in the 1703 English case of Coggs v. Bernard,1 in
which Chief Justice Holt, borrowing from Roman law, established a six-
part bailment classification governed by the purpose for which the
goods were bailed and a determination of whether the benefit derived
from the agreement was mutual or unilateral.32  Although Lord Holt's
analysis laid the foundation for many subsequent classification at-
tempts, this framework is obsolete because it fails to accommodate
many of the complex bailment variations that subsequently developed.
Today, courts routinely hold that bailments may be created absent ac-
tual delivery,3 3 an express contract, 4 or the bailor's consent.35 More-
over, bailments may be complicated arrangements involving a series of
31. 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703).
32. Id. at 912-13, 92 Eng. Rep. at 110.
Holt borrowed heavily from Roman law which also recognized six bailment categories: (1) de-
positum (deposit)-a bailment in which the bailee keeps the property without compensation; (2)
mandatum (mandate)-bailment of goods for the purpose of having active services performed on
them without compensation; (3) commodatum (gratuitous loan)-gratuitous bailment in which the
bailee may use the goods for its own benefit; (4) pignus (pawn or pledge)-bailment in which
goods are delivered to the creditor-bailee and are held as security for a debt; (5) mutuum (loan of
chattels or consumption)-bailment in which the goods delivered are not returned but are ex-
changed for other similar goods; and (6) locatio-conductio (hiring)-bailment for compensation.
See generally W. ELLIOTT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND OTHER CARRIERS § 4 (W.
Hemingway 2d ed. 1929).
In addition, Roman law acknowledged four varieties of "hiring" bailments: (1) locatio rei,
"[t]he hiring of a thing for use;" (2) locatio operi faciendi, "[t]he hiring of work and labor;" (3)
locatio custodies, "[tihe hiring or care and services to be performed on the thing delivered;" and
(4) locatio operis mercium vehendarum, "[t]he hiring of the carriage of goods ... from one place
to another." Id.; see also J. STORY, supra note 4, §§ 8-9.
For American cases discussing the Roman classification, see Slack v. Bryan, 299 Ky. 132, 184
S.W.2d 873 (1945), and Hanes v. Shapiro & Smith, 168 N.C. 24, 84 S.E. 33 (1915).
33. See, e.g., Waugh v. University of Haw., 63 Haw. 117, 621 P.2d 957 (1980) (implying exis-
tence of bailment in absence of delivery of possession and acceptance of the goods); Merritt v.
Nationwide Warehouse Co., 605 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (holding constructive delivery
sufficient to create bailment).
34. See, e.g., Kirby v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1113, 403 N.E.2d 720
(1980) (recognizing an "implied-in-fact" bailment).
35. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Paloni, 95 N.M. 212, 214, 619 P.2d 1256, 1258 (N.M. Ct. App.
1980) (stating that "[a] person who, in the absence of a mutual contract of bailment, lawfully
acquires possession of another's personal property is considered to be a constructive bailee"); see
also Armored Car Serv., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 114 So. 2d 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Capez-
zaro v. Winfrey, 153 N.J. Super. 267, 379 A.2d 493 (1977); Kayanda v. Kamenir, 16 Ohio Misc. 2d
1, 475 N.E.2d 519 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1985).
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bailees and sub-bailees.3
A more modern system of classification, which was adopted by Pro-
fessor Williston, recognizes the presence or absence of compensation as
the distinguishing feature among varieties of bailments. 7 This scheme
consists of four categories: (1) bailments for the bailor's sole benefit; (2)
gratuitous bailments for the bailee's sole benefit; (3) bailments for mu-
tual benefit; and (4) bailments to which the law attaches exceptional
obligations for public policy reasons." Another scheme classifies bail-
ments according to their manner of creation. Under this approach, bail-
ments may be express, implied, or constructive." Express bailments
arise when the parties explicitly agree to assume the roles of bailor and
bailee.4 o Implied bailments are established when the parties, by their
conduct, reach a mutual understanding that a bailor-bailee relationship
will exist.41 Constructive bailments arise by operation of law and nor-
mally lack one or more of the elements required to create a conven-
tional bailment.42 In addition to these two standard classification
systems, several other categorizations, such as professional-ordinary
and gratuitous-lucrative, have emerged in American case law.43 This
Note focuses primarily on commercial bailments, most of which fall into
the "locatio-conducto," "mutual benefit," or "conventional" (i.e., "ex-
press" and "implied") bailment categories."
36. For cases involving sub-bailees, see Siverson v. Martori, 119 Ariz. 440, 581 P.2d 285 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1978); Governor House v. Schmidt, 284 A.2d 660 (D.C. 1971); Revillon Freres v. Cassell
Trucking Co., 24 A.D.2d 846, 264 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1965).
37. 9 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 1033, at 883; see also J. SCHOULER, THE LAW OF BAIL-
MENTS § 6 (4th ed. 1905). For cases applying the Williston classification, see Pettinelli Motors, Inc.
v. Morreale, 39 Misc. 2d 813, 242 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Oneida County Ct. 1963), and Miller v. Hand Ford
Sales, Inc., 216 Or. 567, 340 P.2d 181 (1959).
38. Bailees in the fourth category include common carriers and innkeepers, both of which
were strictly liable for bailed property under the common law. N. PALMER, supra note 1, at 91 n.9;
see also Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Nunley, 671 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that an ar-
rangement in which the debtor left its mining equipment with another company constituted a
bailment under West Virginia law even though the bailee's acceptance was constructive rather
than actual).
39. See N. PALMER, supra note 1, at 91; see, e.g., Kern v. Harris, 30 Or. App. 723, 726, 567
P.2d 1069, 1071 (1977).
40. See N. PALMER, supra note 1, at 91.
41. See Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95, 99 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Robinson v. St.
Clair County, 144 Ill. App. 3d 118, 120-21, 493 N.E.2d 1154, 1155-56 (1986); Mack v. Davidson, 55
A.D.2d 1027, 1028, 391 N.Y.S.2d 497, 499 (1977).
42. See, e.g., Kessman v. City & County of Denver, 709 P.2d 975 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); see
also 9 S. WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 1033, at 884 (discussing the confusion arising from use of the
term "constructive bailment").
43. See, e.g., General Grain, Inc. v. International Harvester Co., 142 Ind. App. 12, 232 N.E.2d
616 (1968) (distinguishing between "professional" and "ordinary" bailees); White v. Burke, 31
Wash. 2d 573, 197 P.2d 1008 (1948) (classifying bailments as either "gratuitous" or "lucrative").
44. This Note will not consider commercial bailees whose functions are quasi-public because
those bailees are regulated heavily by statute. An example of a quasi-public bailee is a common
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B. Current Status
The bailee's duty of care varies according to the type of bailment
created.4 5 Generally, commercial bailees must exercise ordinary dili-
gence to protect the bailed property from damage or loss. 4 6 Ordinary
diligence is that degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise when handling his own goods under similar circumstances.47 A
bailee who would have been reckless with his own property, however, is
not excused from failing to exercise proper diligence when caring for
the property of another.48 Exactly what constitutes ordinary care is a
question for the trier of fact that normally hinges on the nature of the
bailed property, the business of the bailee, and the standards of the
bailee's particular trade.4 9 A bailee is expected to exercise a higher de-
gree of care if the bailed goods are of great value than if they are of
slight value. In Kelton v. Taylor,5 ° for example, the defendant stored
the plaintiff's cotton under a shed. A thief stole the cotton, and the
plaintiff sued the bailee for negligence. Finding that the bailee's method
of storing the cotton was not negligent, the court remarked that "what
would be ordinary diligence. . . in respect to a bag of oats or a bale of
cotton, might be gross negligence as to a bag of gold or a box of
diamonds. ' 51 Trade customs also may influence a court's decision. In
Thackray v. Johnstown Airways, Inc.5 2 a state appellate court over-
turned a jury verdict and held that the bailee was not negligent merely
for failing to employ a night watchman when several airplanes were de-
stroyed in a hangar fire. The court's holding was predicated on the fact
carrier. Warehousemen, because they are regulated by Article 7 of the UCC, are also outside the
scope of this study. See also supra note 38.
45. See R. BROWN, supra note 3, §§ 11.1-11.4.
46. See, e.g., Continental Nat'l Am. Group v. Valley Line Co., 420 F. Supp. 568, 570 (E.D.
Mo. 1976); Rhodes v. Duarte, 142 Ga. App. 885, 237 S.E.2d 212 (1977); M. Bruenger & Co., Inc. v.
Dodge City Truck Stop, Inc., 234 Kan. 682, 685, 675 P.2d 864, 868 (1984); Edwards v. Crestmont
Cadillac Corp., 64 Ohio Misc. 1, 6, 410 N.E.2d 815, 819-20 (1979); Chambers v. Morgan, 671 P.2d
89, 90 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983). See generally R. BROWN, supra note 3, § 11.2.
47. See, e.g., Preston v. Prather, 137 U.S. 604 (1891); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Foss Launch &
Tug Co., 560 P.2d 393, 395 (Alaska 1977).
48. See Wright v. Autohaus Fortense, Inc., 129 Ill. App. 3d 422, 426, 472 N.E.2d 593, 596
(1984).
49. See, e.g., Edwards v. Crestmont Cadillac Corp., 64 Ohio Misc. 1, 6, 410 N.E.2d 815, 819
(1979); Moon v. First Nat'l Bank, 287 Pa. 398, 402, 135 A. 114, 115 (1926).
50. 79 Tenn. 264 (1883).
51. Id. at 266; see also Klotz v. El Morocco Int'l, Ltd., 56 Misc. 2d 319, 326, 288 N.Y.S.2d
684, 692 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1967) (stating that the defendant, a night club owner, was negligent
for failing to exercise that degree of care required of a reasonably prudent night club operator
when guarding motor vehicles of the type (Cadillac) owned by plaintiff), rev'd on other grounds, 63
Misc. 2d 489, 312 N.Y.S.2d 60 (N.Y. App. Term. 1968).
52. 18 Camb. Co. L.J. 73 (Pa. C. 1950).
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that providing night watchmen was not a trade custom.1 3
Despite a bailee's duty to exercise ordinary care absent a special
contract to the contrary, a bailee is not an insurer of the bailed goods",
and is not liable for the preservation of the bailed property.55 Neverthe-
less, most courts agree that bailees may enlarge their common law du-
ties by contract." The precise extent to which bailees may limit their
common law duties, however, is the topic of a continuing debate and
the primary focus of this Note.
5 7
III. BAILEES' METHODS OF LIMITING OR EXCLUDING LIABILITY
A. Express Agreements
Some bailees expressly contract to limit their liability for negli-
gence by inserting into the bailment agreement exculpatory clauses de-
claring that the property is bailed at the bailor's risk, that the bailee is
exonerated from responsibility for loss of or damage to the property in
certain situations, or that the damages for which the bailee might be
held liable is limited to a specific amount. Courts assess the validity of
express exculpatory agreements by determining whether these general
clauses cover instances of bailee negligence or whether the clauses must
specifically mention negligence in order to insulate the bailee from lia-
bility. Although exculpatory clauses are not judicially favored, courts
ordinarily will honor the parties' freedom to contract, absent legislation
to the contrary." When faced with the dilemma of ascertaining the va-
lidity of an exculpatory clause, courts frequently balance the freedom to
limit liability by contract against the forum jurisdiction's public policy.
53. Id. at 75.
54. See, e.g., City of Clearwater v. Thomas, 446 So. 2d 1160, 1161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Torix v. Allred, 100 Idaho 905, 910, 606 P.2d 1334, 1339 (1980); Nimet Indus., Inc. v. Joy Mfg. Co.,
419 N.E.2d 779, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Mannis v. Pine Hills Taxi Co., 87 Misc. 2d 680, 681, 386
N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (Albany City Ct. 1976).
55. See, e.g., Chambers v. Morgan, 671 P.2d 89, 90 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).
56. See, e.g., Big John, B.V. v. Indian Head Grain Co., 718 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983); Elliott v.
Sheridan, Inc., 385 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Stubbs v. Hook, 467 N.E.2d 29, 31 n.1
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984); International Feed Prods., Inc. v. Alfalfa Prods., Inc., 337 N.W.2d 154, 157
(N.D. 1983); Annotation, Bailee's Express Agreement to Return Property, or to Return It in a
Specified Condition, as Enlarging His Common-Law Liability, 150 A.L.R. 269 (1944); cf. Texas W.
Fin. Corp. v. Ideal Builders Hardware Co., 481 S.W.2d 919, 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (prohibiting
a bailee's liability from being enlarged by words of doubtful meaning).
57. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Some courts simply state that bailees may
"modify" their obligations, thus leaving room for bailees to restrict their liability. See, e.g., Davis
v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 988 (Colo. 1986); On Site Energy Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 5
Conn. App. 326, 498 A.2d 121 (1985).
58. See, e.g., Key Biscayne Divers, Inc. v. Marine Stadium Enters., Inc., 490 So. 2d 137 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OwEN, PROSSER AND KEE'rON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 482 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
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The exculpatory provision will fail if it violates public policy, but other-
wise will stand.59 Thus, an agreement that excuses one of the parties for
the consequences of its own negligent conduct may be enforced.60
There are several exceptions to the general rule that permits par-
ties to employ exculpatory clauses. The Restatement of Contracts, for
example, suggests that an agreement extinguishing one party's liability
for negligence is illegal to the extent that it attempts to absolve that
party of liability for gross negligence. 1 The Restatement also forbids
exemptions that excuse willful breaches of duty and exemptions cover-
ing persons "charged with a duty of public service."62
Professor Prosser also recognizes exceptions to the general rule.6 3
Although Prosser insists that parties should be free to contract, 4 he
also asserts that when a large discrepancy in bargaining power places
one party at the mercy of the other party's negligence, the contract is
void as a matter of public policy. 5 On the other hand, when the parties
possess roughly equal bargaining power, exculpatory clauses normally
are allowed. 6  Prosser also advocates a prohibition against exculpatory
clauses limiting liability for negligence in transactions that affect the
59. Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provision by One Other than Carrier or Employer
for Exemption from Liability, or Indemnification, for Consequences of Own Negligence, 175
A.L.R. 8, 14-15 (1948).
Public policy is an amorphous concept. Several cases have indicated that public policy imports
a standard that is uncertain and varies with changes in economic needs, social customs,and usages
of trade. See, e.g., Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Noll, 115 Ind. App. 289, 295-96, 58 N.E.2d 947, 950
(1945); Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 183, 192-93, 307 P.2d 175, 181 (1957); Pendleton v. Greever, 80
Okla. 35, 37, 193 P. 885, 887 (1920) (observing that "public policy" "has never been defined by the
courts, but has been let loose and free from definition"). According to Black's Law Dictionary, the
term "public policy" embodies "[t]he principles under which the freedom of contract or private
dealings is restricted by law for the good of the community." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th
ed. 1979). Public policy often is enunciated by the legislature in the form of statutes. Even when a
statute exists, however, courts have broad interpretive powers. In the absence of a valid statute,
courts have even broader powers. Thus, public policy is at best a vague concept that can be molded
by a court to serve almost any purpose.
60. See PROSSER, supra note 58, at 482.
61. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 574 (1932). Gross negligence is conduct that falls greatly
below "the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm." Id. at comment.
62. Id. § 575.
63. PROSSER, supra note 58, at 482-84.
64. Id. at 482.
65. Id.; see also Annotation, supra note 59, at 16-17.
66. PROSSER, supra note 58, at 483. See generally Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens
Bldgs., 20 Ill. App. 2d 1, 155 N.E.2d 372 (1958).
Although no definite rules exist to guide courts in measuring the relative bargaining power of
contracting parties, two factors are paramount: the importance of the contract to the physical or
economic well-being of the party agreeing to the release of liability and the existence and extent of
competition among the group to which the exempting party belongs. See Annotation, supra note
59, at 16-17.
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public interest, such as agreements involving common carriers, public
utilities, and innkeepers.17 This exception, which overlaps with the une-
qual bargaining power exception, has been extended to commercial bail-
ees who are under no duty to protect the public interest but who deal
with the public on a regular basis, such as owners of parking garages
and operators of parcel checkrooms. The rationale for preventing these
quasi-public bailees from limiting their liability for negligence is based
on the public's need for their services and individual customers' lack of
actual bargaining power.6 8
In Allright v. Elledge,ee for example, the bailor's car was stolen
from the bailee's parking garage and the bailor sued the bailee for the
value of the car. The parties had executed a contract under which the
bailor paid fifty dollars a month to park in the bailee's lot.70 The con-
tract included a provision limiting the bailee's liability for loss of or
damage to the bailor's car to 100 dollars unless the bailor wished to
negotiate for additional coverage at a higher fee.7 1 The court held that
the contract violated public policy and therefore was void because cus-
tomers of a public parking garage possess little actual bargaining power
and consequently have no choice but to accept the garage's limitations
of liability.
7 2
Banks are another type of bailee that fall within the scope of Pro-
fessor Prosser's public interest exception. Several courts have voided
exculpatory clauses in contracts concerning safe deposit box rentals and
night depository facilities73 because banking is an essential service that
67. PROSSER, supra note 58, at 482-83; see also Comment, supra note 24, at 56.
68. PROSSER, supra note 58, at 483.
69. 508 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
70. Id. at 865.
71. Id. at 867-68. The first paragraph of the "Contract Parking Agreement" read:
Contract parking is on a month to month basis. In consideration of the low rates charged for
parking, operator will not be responsible for loss by fire, misdelivery or theft, except such loss
occasioned by negligence of operator, and then only up to a maximum of $100.00. Proportion-
ately greater rates must be paid in advance if customer sets larger limits of liability.
Id.
72. See id. at 869. On certification of a question, however, the Texas Supreme Court stated
that it did not feel "the occupation [of parking lot owner] to command so dominant a position."
Allright, Inc. v. Elledge, 515 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1974).
73. See, e.g., Sniffen v. Century Nat'l Bank, 375 So. 2d 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (insist-
ing that the bank could not rely on an exculpatory clause contained in the safety deposit box
contract to defeat the claim that the bank had breached the contract by negligently permitting an
unauthorized person to gain access to the customer's box); Hy-Grade Oil Co. v. New Jersey Bank,
138 N.J. Super. 112, 350 A.2d 279 (1975); Employer's Ins. of Wausau v. Chemical Bank, 117 Misc.
2d 601, 459 N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1983); Real Good Food Store, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank,
276 Or. 1057, 557 P.2d 654 (1976). But see Valley Nat'l Bank v. Tang, 18 Ariz. App. 40, 42, 499
P.2d 991, 993 (1972) (stating that "there is no reason in terms of. . . social policy, why a bank
cannot make the facility available under terms and conditions which place the risk of loss on the
customer"); FDIC v. Carr6, 436 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). See generally Annotation,
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the public relies on and because night depository and safe deposit ser-
vices are integral parts of the banking business. 4
In Hy-grade Oil Co. v. New Jersey Bank7 5 the Superior Court of
New Jersey held that a bank could not contractually exculpate itself
from responsibility for negligently performing night depository services.
The contract between the plaintiff oil company and the bank was
printed on a standardized form and provided that the bank was not
responsible for the loss or destruction of the deposit bag or the bag's
contents.78 The contract also stated that because the bank offered night
depository facilities for its customers' convenience, customers used the
night depository at their own risk.77 The manager of the oil company
failed to read this section of the contract before signing the agree-
ment.78 Two days after the manager placed a substantial sum of money
into the night depository, he learned that the funds had not been
credited to the oil company's account.7 9 Upon further inquiry, the man-
ager discovered that the deposit pouch, which was in the bank's posses-
sion, had been torn in two and was empty. When the money could not
be located, the oil company sued the bank for negligence.80 The court
held that a party under a public duty to exercise special care could not
escape liability for its own negligence by means of a contractual provi-
sion. 1 More specifically, the court stated that banks perform "an im-
portant and necessary public service" and should not be allowed to
avoid liability for negligence in providing night depository services.
8 2
In contrast, marina owners are bailees whose use of exculpatory
clauses is not invalid under Professor Prosser's public interest excep-
tion. In Key Biscayne Divers, Inc. v. Marina Stadium Enterprises,
Inc.8 s the plaintiff stored his boat at the defendant's marina.84 The
boat, which the plaintiff used for commercial diving, was destroyed
when its storage rack collapsed. Although the plaintiff's insurance com-
Liability of Bank in Connection with Night Depository Service, 77 A.L.R.3d 597 (1977).
74. Gramore Stores, Inc. v. Banker's Trust Co., 93 Misc. 2d 112, 402 N.Y.S.2d 326 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1978).
75. 138 N.J. Super. 112, 350 A.2d 279 (1975).
76. Id. at 114, 350 A.2d at 280.
77. Id. at 115, 350 A.2d at 280.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 115, 350 A.2d at 281.
81. Id. at 116-17, 350 A.2d at 281.
82. Id. at 118, 350 A.2d at 282. UCC § 4-103 prevents a bank from disclaiming or limiting its
liability for lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care in connection with bank deposits
and collections. The Hy-Grade Oil court relied in part on this UCC provision to void the bank's
exculpatory clause. Id. at 117, 350 A.2d at 282.
83. 490 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
84. Id. at 138.
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pany reimbursed him for the full value of the boat, he sued the marina
owner for consequential damages. 5 The storage agreement in question
provided that the marina was immune from all liability for loss of life
and property damage resulting from ordinary negligence or from fire,
theft, windstorm, or other casualty loss.86 The plaintiff contended that
the exculpatory clause did not relieve the bailee-marina owner of re-
sponsibility for his own negligence and that the clause was void as a
matter of public policy. 7 While expressing a general disfavor of clauses
exculpating a party's negligence, the court nevertheless enforced the
clause because the parties possessed equal bargaining power and be-
cause no public policy factors precluded enforcement of the exculpatory
provisions."
When upholding an exculpatory clause courts generally will strictly
construe the clause against the drafting party. 9 Therefore, if a bailee
intends to incorporate into the contract an exculpatory provision legally
voiding the consequences of its own negligence, the clause must be clear
and unambiguous and must include the word "negligence."9' 0 By con-
struing general exculpatory clauses that do not explicitly mention negli-
gence as not covering negligent acts, many courts have developed a
convenient and practical means for invalidating stipulations that might
have limited a bailee's liability for negligence."
Strict construction in contract interpretation may disadvantage de-
85. Id.
86. The storage agreement stated:
The owner for himself, . . . hereby releases and agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the
company ...for any and all . . . loss of life and property damage: (1) arising out of the
ordinary negligence of the company or its employees and agents in connection with the Com-
pany's premises or the use of storage spaces. . . (3) for loss or damage to the Owner's boat
... or contents there-due to fire, theft, vandalism, collision, marina equipment failure,
windstorm, rain, hurricane or other casualty loss.
Id.
87. Id. at 137-38.
88. Id. at 138; see also Fahey v. Gledhill, 33 Cal. App. 3d 884, 663 P.2d 197, 191 Cal. Rptr.
639 (1983) (holding that under admiralty law an exculpatory clause freeing a ship repairer from
liability for negligence is not contrary to public policy). See generally Annotation, Liability of
Operator of Marina or Boatyard for Loss of or Injury to Pleasure Boat Left for Storage or Repair,
44 A.L.R.3d 1332 (1972).
89. See, e.g., Big John, B.V. v. Indian Head Grain Co., 718 F.2d 143, 146-47 (5th Cir. 1983)
(stating that "[a] provision purporting to exonerate the bailee from his negligence will be strictly
construed"); Goldbaum v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 543 F. Supp. 434, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Harbor
One, Inc. v. Preston, 172 So. 2d 478, 479 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Peck v. Masonic Manor Apart-
ment Hotel, 203 Neb. 308, 313, 278 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1979); Fowler v. One Sequin Art Center, 617
S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
90. See, e.g., Fowler v. One Seguin Art Center, 617 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981);
see also Peck v. Masonic Manor Apartment Hotel, 203 Neb. 308, 313, 278 N.W.2d 589, 593 (1979).
91. Annotation, supra note 59, at 18. But see Fahey v. Gledhill, 33 Cal. App. 3d 884, 893-94,
663 P.2d 197, 204, 191 Cal. Rptr. 639, 646 (1983) (indicating that a direct reference to "negligence"
is not required in an exculpatory clause).
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fendant-bailees who claim that their liability for negligence was limited
or excluded by virtue of a contractual provision. In Fowler v. One
Seguin Art Center,92 for example, the owner of a sculpture agreed to
display the work at the defendant's art center. During the exhibition,
the piece was damaged by an art center employee.93 When the plaintiff
demanded reimbursement for the damaged sculpture, the gallery re-
plied that a disclaimer in the exhibition agreement absolved the gallery
from any liability for damage. 94 The plaintiff claimed that the exculpa-
tory clause was invalid because it did not expressly cover negligent
acts. 5 The court agreed with the plaintiff's argument and refused to
absolve the art center of liability by stiictly construing the exculpatory
clause. The court also noted that the clause in question failed partly
because it did not inform the bailor that the bailee intended to limit
liability for the bailee's own negligence. 9
A Nebraska court addressed a similar issue in Peck v. Masonic
Manor Apartment Hotel,9" 7 which arose out of a boat storage agreement
between the bailor and the bailee. The contract provided that the bailee
"shall not be held liable for any damage to these boats and equipment
while on the premises."9 8 The bailor returned to check on his boat three
months later and discovered that the boat was missing.99 The bailee
failed to locate the boat, and the bailor sued for 5000 dollars, the mar-
ket value of the boat at the time it disappeared. The bailee responded
that the contractual disclaimer exempted it from liability for negligent
loss of the boat.100 The court disagreed, holding that the term "loss"
was not synonymous with the narrower term "damage."' 01
When evaluating the validity of express agreements to limit a
bailee's liability for negligence, courts generally enforce exculpatory
clauses that are clear, specific, and not contrary to public policy. 02 On
the other hand, if the terms of the exculpatory clause are doubtful or
ambiguous and the bailee possesses greater bargaining power than the
bailor, or if the bailee has been entrusted with a public duty, courts
usually will invalidate the limitation provisions.10 3 Courts, however,
92. 617 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
93. Id. at 764.
94. The clause read: "The One Seguin Art Center. . . assumes no responsibility for loss or
damage of paintings and sculpture." Id.
95. Id. at 765.
96. Id.
97. 203 Neb. 308, 278 N.W.2d 589 (1979).
98. Id. at 309, 278 N.W.2d at 591.
99. Id. at 311, 278 N.W.2d at 592.
100. Id. at 313, 278 N.W.2d at 593.
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 59, 66, 83-91 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 59, 61-62, 65, 67-83, 92-101 and accompanying text.
19881
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
have tremendous leeway to balance many factors and to interpret freely
the meaning of the terms "clear," "specific," and "public policy."'10 De-
termining what constitutes a "disparity in bargaining power" or "public
duty" is also within the discretion of the court.10 5 Because courts do not
always strike the same balance given a particular set of facts, the out-
comes of cases examining the validity of exculpatory clauses are not as
consistent as this analysis might suggest.
B. State Statutes
Four western states-California, Montana, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota-have enacted statutes that limit a bailee's liability for negli-
gence. 106 These identically worded statutes read: "The liability of a de-
positary for negligence cannot exceed the amount which he is informed
by the depositor, or has reason to suppose, the thing deposited to be
worth."'01 7 An Oklahoma court interpreted its statute to mean that de-
positories cannot completely limit their liability for negligence. 08
In Hoffman v. Eastman Kodak Co.,'09 the seminal interpretation of
the California statute, the plaintiff delivered film containing moving
pictures of his Grand Canyon vacation to the defendant for develop-
ment. The plaintiff testified that the primary motivation for his trip
was to experiment with the film in question. The defendant lost the
film, and the plaintiff sued to recover 302 dollars, the total cost of his
vacation." 0 Because the plaintiff neglected to inform the defendant of
the special value of the film, the defendant, relying on the statute, ar-
gued that it had reasonably assumed that the balled property was not
extraordinarily valuable."' The court agreed with the defendant's read-
ing of the statute and limited the defendant's liability to the retail cost
of the lost film." 2 Thus, as interpreted by the courts, the four state
bailment statutes provide that the amount of damages recoverable by a
bailor for a bailee's negligent loss of goods is limited to the value of
those goods as disclosed by the bailor unless the bailee had reason to
know or suspect that the goods were more valuable than the bailor has
represented.
104. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
105. Id.
106. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1840 (West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-6-204 (1987); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 460 (West 1966); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-39-17 (1983).
107. See supra note 106.
108. Chambers v. Morgan, 671 P.2d 89, 90 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983).
109. 99 Cal. App. 436, 278 P. 891 (1929). Plaintiff had purchased a new type of film from
Kodak.
110. Id. at 437, 278 P. at 891.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 438, 278 P. at 891.
[Vol. 41:129
1988] COMMERCIAL BAILMENTS
A more common type of bailment statute limits innkeepers' liabil-
ity for lost, damaged, or destroyed property to a specified amount.113
Statutes limiting innkeepers' liability for loss of or injury to a guest's
property generally reflect a legislative intent to alleviate the harsh rule
of absolute liability imposed on innkeepers at common law.114 While
most state innkeeper statutes resemble each other in certain respects,
there are important differences. One type of innkeeper statute estab-
lishes a recovery limit for lost or damaged property, but eliminates the
ceiling when the loss or damage results from the innkeeper's negli-
gence.11 5 Thus, if the guest can prove that the innkeeper acted negli-
gently, the guest may recover the full value of the lost or damaged
property, not merely the statutory sum.
113. All 50 states and the District of Columbia have statutes permitting innkeepers and hotel
owners to limit their liability for their guests' baggage and/or other valuables. See ALA. CODE §§
34-15-12 to -15 (1985); ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.56.050 to .060 (1986); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-302
(1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-1107 to -1110 (1979); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1859-1860 (West 1985); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 12-44-109 to -112 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1 to -2 (West 1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 509.111 (West Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-8 to -12 (1984); HAW. REV. STAT. §§
486K-4 to -9 (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-1823 to -1824 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 71, paras. 1
to 4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-8-28-1 to -5 (Burns 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. §
105.1 to .9 (West 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-402 to -403 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 306.020
to .030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1981); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. §§ 2965-2971 (West 1952 & Supp. 1987);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 2901-2904 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 71, § 3 (1983 & Supp. 1986);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, §§ 10-13 (West 1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 427.101 to .102
(West 1978 & Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.71 (West Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-
73-1, -5, -7 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 419.010 to .030 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-6-501
to -505 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 41-208 to -214 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.010 (Michie
1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353:1 (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 29:2-2 to :2-4 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-6-1 (1987); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 200-202 (McKinney Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 72-3 to
-6 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 60-01-29 to -33 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4721.01 to .03
(Anderson 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 501-503(b) (West 1966); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 699.010-
.040 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, §§ 61-65 (Purdon 1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-14-1 to -2 (1976);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-40-1 to -6 (1983);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-7-103, -106 (1986); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4592 (Vernon 1976); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 29-1-1 to -3 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 3141-3143 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 35.1-28
(1984); WASH REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.48.030, .070 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 16-6-22 (1985); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 50.80 to .82 (West 1987); Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-17-101 to -102 (1986).
114. See generally 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW AND OTHER WRITINGS 175 (1881); J.
SHERRY, THE LAWS OF INNKEEPERS § 18.3 (1972); Arterburn, The Early Liability of a Bailee, 25
MICH. L. REV. 479 (1927). Because these exculpatory statutes are in derogation of the common law,
they generally are construed strictly. See Kalpakian v. Oklahoma Sheraton Corp., 398 F.2d 243
(10th Cir. 1968). One reason for absolute liability "was to protect travelers against the dishonest
practices of innkeepers and their servants." Phoenix Assurance Co. of N.Y. v. Royale Inv. Co., 393
S.W.2d 43, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); J. SHERRY, supra, § 18.1.
115. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.56.050(b) (1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-73-7 (1972); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 41-208 (1984); N.H. REV. STAT. § 353:1 (1984); Thx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. § 4592
(Vernon 1976); Wyo. STAT. § 33-17-101 (1986). See generally Annotation, Statutory Limitations
upon Innkeeper's Liability as Applicable Where Guest's Property is Lost or Damaged Through
Innkeeper's Negligence, 37 A.L.R.3d 1276, 1283-85 (1971).
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In Shamrock Hilton Hotel v. Caranas"16 a Texas court applied this
type of statute to a case involving a patron of the Shamrock Hilton who
left her purse in the hotel restaurant. A busboy delivered the purse to a
cashier who subsequently misdelivered it." 7 The purse allegedly con-
tained five dollars in cash, several credit cards, and ten pieces of jewelry
worth over thirteen thousand dollars." 8 The owner discovered her loss
the next morning and promptly notified the hotel authorities. When the
purse could not be relocated, the owner filed suit against the hotel al-
leging that the hotel was negligent in delivering the purse to an un-
known person. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed a jury finding
that the hotel cashier acted negligently by delivering the purse to some-
one other than the actual owner, 119 and held that the hotel was liable
for all of the contents of the purse, as well as for the purse itself.120 The
court added that the state statute limiting the hotel's liability to 500
dollars did not control because the statute is inapplicable when the
guest's loss results from the hotel's own negligence.12" '
A second type of innkeeper statute permits hotels to limit their lia-
bility regardless of negligence.12 2 In Associated Mills, Inc. v. Drake Ho-
tel, Inc.123 the bailor left the only working prototype of a massage
machine, which he manufactured, in the bailee-hotel where it had been
displayed at a conference. In order to protect the machine, the bailor
requested that the hotel seal the exhibit room overnight. The next
morning the bailor discovered that the room had not been locked and
that the prototype was missing. The bailor sued for a total of 87,123
dollars, which included the cost of developing and manufacturing the
116. 488 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). The bailment was a constructive bailment. Id.;
see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
117. Shamrock, 488 S.W.2d at 152-53. There was no testimony on the question of whether
the cashier requested to see identification before relinquishing possession of the purse. Id.
118. Id. at 153.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 155-56. The hotel argued that a bailment "existed only as to 'the purse and the
usual petty cash or credit cards found therein' and not to the jewelry of which the hotel had no
actual notice." Id. at 155. The court held, however, that the hotel was liable for the value of the
jewelry because it was reasonably foreseeable that a hotel guest "might have her jewelry in her
purse either awaiting a present occasion to wear it or following reclaiming it from the hotel safe in
anticipation of leaving the hotel." Id.
121. Id. at 153; see also TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. § 4592 (Vernon 1973) (providing, in
pertinent part, that "[a]ny hotel . . . who constantly has . . . a metal safe or vault . . . for the
custody [of patrons' valuables] . . . shall not be liable for the loss or injury suffered by any guest
. . . in excess . . . of fifty dollars . . . provided, such loss or injury does not occur through the
negligence . . . of said hotel" (emphasis added)).
122. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 71, para. 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 32-8-28-1 (Burns 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-6-1 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 60-01-30 (1985).
See generally Annotation, supra note 115, at 1285-86.
123. 31 Ill. App. 3d 304, 334 N.E.2d 746 (1975).
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machine, loss of sales, and consequential damages resulting from the
increased costs associated with manufacturing the product without the
prototype. 24 The hotel moved to strike all damage requests that ex-
ceeded 250 dollars, the statutory ceiling for an innkeeper's liability to a
guest for lost or damaged property.12 5 The Appellate Court of Illinois
granted the hotel's motion because the Illinois Innkeepers' Act limits a
hotel's liability regardless of whether the loss or damage resulted from
the hotel's own negligence. 2 '
A third type of innkeeper statute either does not specifically men-
tion negligence or fails to indicate whether an innkeeper's negligence
affects the limitation of liability. 127 Statutes falling into this category
have been interpreted in one of two ways, depending on the jurisdic-
tion. Some courts have enforced the statutory limitation in spite of the
hotel's negligence;12 8 others have refused to allow hotelkeepers to limit
liability for their own negligence.
12
Many of the innkeeper statutes that restrict patrons' recovery for
property loss or damage declare that the limitations will not be en-
forced if the innkeeper fails to post copies of the exculpatory statute in
conspicuous places throughout the hotel.130 In Terry v. Lincscott Hotel
124. Id. at 305, 334 N.E.2d at 747.
125. The Illinois statute reads in pertinent part: "Whenever. . . any hotel provides a safe or
vault. . . for the safekeeping [of guests' valuables] . . . such hotel. . . [shall not be] liable for loss
or damage in an amount exceeding $250, regardless of whether such loss or damage is occasioned
by. . . the ... negligence of such [hotel] . . . " ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 71, para. 1 (Smith-Hurd 1957
& Supp. 1987).
126. Associated Mills, 31 I1. App. 3d at 308-09, 334 N.E.2d at 749-50; see also supra note
125. The court noted that the only way an innkeeper can incur liability larger than that allowed in
the statute is by signing a written agreement to do so. 31 Ill. App. 3d at 310, 334 N.E.2d at 750.
127. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1859-1860 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.111 (West
Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 419.010 to .030 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 62-7-103 (1986). See generally Annotation, supra note 115, at 1286-91.
128. For cases holding that a general exculpatory statute governs the loss of or damage to
property caused by an innkeeper's negligence and that the guest can recover damages only up to
the statutory ceiling, see, e.g., Ricketts v. Morehead Co., 122 Cal.App. 2d 948, 265 P.2d 963 (1954),
and Savoy Hotel Corp. v. Sparks, 57 Tenn. App. 537, 421 S.W.2d 98 (1967).
129. For cases holding that the statutory limitation does not apply and that guests may re-
cover the full and actual value of their losses, see, e.g., Layton v. Seward Corp., 320 Mich. 418, 31
N.W.2d 678 (1948); Schiffman v. Narragansett Hotel, Inc., 86 R.I. 258, 134 A.2d 153 (1957).
130. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.56.050 (1982) (stating that the hotel must display the notice
in "three or more conspicuous places"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-302 (1974 & Supp. 1986); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 71-1107 (1979) (indicating that the hotel must keep a copy of this section "constantly
and conspicuously posted in not less than ten [10] conspicuous places in said hotel"); CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1860 (1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1 (1981) (declaring that the hotel must post com-
plete copies of the statute in every guest room of the hotel); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2901
(1978) (asserting that notices must be posted "conspicuously. . . in not less than 10 conspicuous
places in all in said hotel"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-6-1 (1987); Wyo. STAT. § 33-17-102 (1987). These
provisions present the general problems associated with disclaimers posted on signs. See infra
notes 168-86 and accompanying text.
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Corp.' four guests sued the hotel to recover damages for the loss of
jewelry and other items that were stolen from their rooms. Relying on
the state statute restricting the liability of innkeepers, the hotel owner
moved for partial summary judgment for the loss attributable to the
stolen jewelry." 2 The court granted the hotel's motion, but proceeded
to discuss the ramifications of an innkeeper's failure to post properly
notices concerning the availability of a vault for guests' valuables. The
court declared that an innkeeper must comply strictly with the terms of
the statute in order to relieve itself of the harsh common law liability. 3
The court also held that an innkeeper may fail to direct the guests'
attention to the availability of a safe for their valuables and still comply
with the technical terms of the statute.'3 " The court found that the ho-
tel complied with the statutory requirements because the notices were
"readily understandable."' 35 The guests, however, asserted that because
the posted notices were not conspicuous, the adequacy of the notices'
content was immaterial. The guests admitted that copies of the notice
were placed on the dressers in their rooms, but argued that "placing"
the notice did not fulfill the requirement of "posting" the notice.33 The
court rejected this argument and stated that "post," as used in the stat-
131. 126 Ariz. 548, 617 P.2d 56 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). Interestingly, this decision was written
by now United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
For other cases discussing the posting of notices, see, e.g., Skyways Motor Lodge, Corp. v.
General Foods Corp., 403 A.2d 722 (Del. 1979) (holding that the motel was not entitled to statu-
tory protection against an innkeeper's absolute liability at common law when the notice of limita-
tion of liability on the guest's motel door did not advise him of the existence of a secure safe and
when the notice appeared only on a guest registration card and the motel room door and not "in
every lodging room and other conspicuous places" as required by state statute); Zurich Ins. Co. v.
Fairmont Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 250 So. 2d 94 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that if the hotel posted
notices quoting the statutory language limiting the innkeeper's liability in a conspicuous place in
the room of a fur salesman, then the hotel complied with the terms of the statute and its liability
was limited to $100 for stolen furs, regardless of whether the hotel was negligent); Brewer v.
Roosevelt Motor Lodge, 295 A.2d 647 (Me. 1972) (observing that under the state statute no inn-
keeper who keeps a suitable safe and who posts copies of the statute will be held liable for loss of
or injury to a guest's property unless the guest offers property for safekeeping and that the inn-
keeper's liability is limited to $300 regardless of whether he has complied with conditions of the
statute).
132. 126 Ariz. at 550, 617 P.2d at 58. The statute provides that:
An innkeeper who maintains a fireproof safe and gives notice by posting in a conspicuous
place in the office or in the room of each guest that money, jewelry, documents and other
articles of small size and unusual value may be deposited in the safe, is not liable for loss of or
injury to any such article not deposited in the safe, which is not the result of his own act.
ARz. REV. STAT. § 33-302(A) (1974) (emphasis added).
133. Terry, 126 Ariz. at 552, 617 P.2d at 61; see also supra note 10. The guests alleged that
the notice placed in their rooms was inadequate because it failed to advise them that the hotel's
safe was fireproof. 126 Ariz. at 553, 617 P.2d at 61.




ute, includes either physical attachment or placement of the notice in a
room. 137
Statutory provisions lend certainty and predictability to the law of
bailment only when the statutes are clear, unambiguous, and consist-
ently applied. Even the best of these statutes, however, do not address
the problems, particularly important in diversity cases, of lack of uni-
formity among the states. 138 Moreover, these exculpatory statutes apply
to hotels but not to similar facilities like restaurants. Promulgating dif-
ferent rules for different commercial bailees may be necessary on occa-
sion, but this practice could present additional problems. Individualized
statutes may lead to definitional problems; for example, courts may
have difficulty in determining whether a party is an "innkeeper" or
some other type of bailee."' One solution to the problems caused by
variations among state statutes lies in the development of a uniform
method of analyzing bailees' disclaimers of liability for negligence.
C. Disclaimers on Receipts and Tickets
Many bailees print exculpatory clauses on customer receipts or
tickets. These limitations of liability frequently appear in small print
and often are placed on the back of the receipt. Courts disagree on
whether these disclaimers are effective. Bailors attacking such disclaim-
ers in court generally assert lack of assent to any agreement containing
the limitation of liability. Courts have employed two methods when an-
alyzing mutual assent problems. Some courts have held that a customer
receipt is a manifestation of the bailment agreement. The bailor, by ac-
cepting the receipt, assents to all of the contract terms printed thereon
if a reasonable person in the same position would have realized that a
contract was being proposed.14 0 Under this method, there generally is
137. Id. The court quoted the definition of "post" found in Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary. Id.
138. For a diversity case involving statutes limiting innkeepers' liability, see, e.g., Owens v.
Summa Corp., 625 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Nevada substantive law to a case filed in
Louisiana federal court); see also Pacific Diamond Co. v. San Francisco Superior Court, 85 Cal.
App. 3d 871, 149 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1978) (applying Colorado substantive law).
139. Cf. McFarland v. C.A.R. Corp., 58 N.J. Super. 449, 156 A.2d 488 (1959) (holding that a
restauranteur was not an "innkeeper," and that liability could not be imposed upon a
restauranteur as an innkeeper for damage to patron's automobile while in restaurant's parking lot);
Ambassador Athletic Club v. State Tax Comm'n, 27 Utah 2d 377, 496 P.2d 883 (1972) (stating that
an athletic club was not a "hotel"); Armwood v. Francis, 9 Utah 2d 147, 340 P.2d 88 (1959) (con-
cluding that a restaurant, in and of itself, is not an "inn" either in the common law or modern
sense).
140. See, e.g., Carr v. Hoosier Photo Supplies, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. 1982); Savoy Hotel
Corp. v. Sparks, 57 Tenn. App. 537, 421 S.W.2d 98 (1967) (holding that exculpatory language
printed on automobile claim check was valid). This result may not occur in cases in which a ticket
containing a disclaimer is issued by an automatic machine. See Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking
19881
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no inquiry into whether the bailor read and understood the dis-
claimer. 141 Other courts refuse to honor the exculpatory clause unless
the bailor had actual notice of its contents. This method usually is em-
ployed when the bailor contends that the ticket or receipt was merely a
token for identification, not a statement of contractual provisions.
142
This second method is a corollary of the rule that if a person assents to
a document believing it to be something other than what it actually is,
the instrument is void.1
43
In Carr v. Hoosier Photo Supplies, Inc.14 4 the Supreme Court of
Indiana enforced an exculpatory clause printed on the back of a cus-
tomer's receipt. 4 5 The plaintiff, an attorney and amateur photogra-
pher," purchased ten rolls of Kodak film for his trip to Spain and
France. 147 Upon returning from Europe, the plaintiff took nine exposed
Ltd., 2 W.L.R. 585 (C.A. 1971) (holding that "the [parking] ticket comes too late" for a disclaimer
printed thereon to become part of the contract).
141. This rule flows from Section 70 of the Restatement of Contracts:
One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who manifests acceptance of the terms of
a writing which he should reasonably understand to be an offer or proposed contract, is bound
by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the writing or of its proper interpretation.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 70 (1932); see also id. at illustrations 3 & 4 (implying that the
offeree would be bound when a reasonable man would have understood both that a contract had
been formed and that the disclaimer was part of the contract). See generally Note, Contract
Clauses in Fine Print, 63 HARV. L. REv. 494 (1950).
142. See, e.g., Bowes v. Fox-Stanley Photo Prods., 379 So. 2d 844 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Brooks
v. Angelo's Cleaners, 103 A.D.2d 923, 477 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1984).
In one well known case, the plaintiff delivered a bag to the parcel room of a railroad station
and received a check which, on the reverse side, stated the following condition: "The depositor in
accepting this duplicate coupon expressly agrees that the company shall not be liable to him or her
for any loss or damage of any piece to an amount exceeding $10." This condition was in fine print.
The plaintiff did not read the ticket and the defendant failed to call the disclaimer to the plain-
tiff's attention. When the plaintiff attempted to reclaim his bag he discovered that it had been
misdelivered. The defendant conceded liability but claimed that its obligation did not exceed $10.
The court struck down the exculpatory clause and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for
the full amount of his loss. The court explained that "[i]n the mind of the bailor the little piece of
cardboard . . . did not arise to the dignity of a contract." Healy v. New York Cent. & Hudson
River R.R. Co., 153 A.D. 516, 519-20, 138 N.Y.S. 287, 290 (1912), afl'd mem., 210 N.Y. 646, 105
N.E. 1086 (1914).
143. Calamari, Duty to Read-A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341, 344-45 (1974).
144. 441 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. 1982). For the opinion of the Indiana Court of Appeals, which was
reversed by the Indiana Supreme Court, see 422 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). See generally
Krieger, Survey-Property, 16 IND. L. REv. 283, 288-90 (1983).
145. 441 N.E.2d at 456.
146. Id. at 452. Carr was a graduate of Harvard Law School, was a named partner in an
Indianapolis law firm, and was a former secretary of the Indiana State Bar Association. At the
time of the case, Carr had been an amateur photographer for twelve years. Agreed Statement of
Facts, Carr v. Hoosier Photo Supplies, Inc., No. M172-1342 at 1, 4 (Marion County Mun. Ct. 1975)
[hereinafter Agreed Statement].
147. Carr, 441 N.E.2d at 452. According to Carr, the lost photographs could not be dupli-
cated. "They were the only such exposed film in existence. They represented the documentation of
a meticulously planned trip and the record of a once in a lifetime experience." Carr studied the
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rolls of film to the defendant photo store for processing. The photo
store accepted delivery of the film,14 8 gave the plaintiff a numbered re-
ceipt for each roll, and sent the film to the defendant film developer.149
The back of each receipt contained a notice stating that the developer's
liability was limited to the replacement of damaged or lost film with an
equivalent amount of unexposed film or film processing services, even if
the developer was found to have acted negligently. 50 Although the
plaintiff failed to read the notice and the photo store neglected to call it
to his attention, the plaintiff knew from his practical and legal experi-
ence that most film processors placed similar exculpatory clauses on re-
ceipts."' When only five of the nine rolls of film were returned to the
plaintiff, he filed suit against both bailees, requesting a total of 10,000
dollars in damages. 52 The parties stipulated that at least one of the
defendants breached the bailment contract by negligently losing the
film. 5' Yet both defendants argued that the exculpatory clause was
valid and that they were liable only for the replacement cost of four
history of the region of Spain he intended to visit and planned a detailed itinerary following the
route of the early pilgrims traveling to see the remains of St. James. Agreed Statement, supra note
146, at 5-6, 10-11.
148. Carr, 441 N.E.2d at 452. "A typical customer . . . receipt issued by Hoosier . . .is a
printed form approximately one inch by two inches. .. " Agreed Statement, supra note 146, at 3,
6.
149. In the court of appeals, Kodak and Hoosier argued that while they accepted delivery of
the film, they did not accept delivery of the photographic images on the film. Carr, 422 N.E.2d at
1275.
150. The receipt stated:
READ THIS NOTICE
Although film price does not include processing. . .the return of any film or print to us for
processing ... will constitute an agreement by you that if any such film or print is damaged
by us or any subsidiary company, even though by negligence or other fault, it will be replaced
with an equivalent amount of unexposed . . . film and processing and, except for such re-
placement, the handling of such film or prints by us for any purpose is without other war-
ranty or liability.
Carr, 441 N.E.2d at 452 (emphasis added). The boxes of film Carr purchased also displayed a
limitation of liability. Id.
151. Id. Some people feel that Carr lost the case because he was an attorney and "should
have known better." If true, one wonders whether an attorney has an absolute obligation to read.
If so, this "duty" could be carried to ridiculous extremes.
In a recent San Francisco jury trial, an attorney who worked part time as a free-lance profes-
sional photographer was awarded $5000 because Kodak lost some of his photographs. Kodak un-
successfully argued that its responsibility was limited to supplying the plaintiff with one new roll
of film. Hughey, Photographer's Legal Challenge Takes Aim At Photofinishers that Lose, Damage
Film, Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 1983, at 29, col. 1.
152. Carr, 441 N.E.2d at 451. The requested damages reflected the amount necessary to
reshoot a set of similar photographs, including round-trip transportation to Spain, expenses while
in Spain, and an allowance for the reasonable value of a photographer's services. Agreed State-
ment, supra note 146, at 11-13.
153. Carr, 441 N.E.2d at 452.
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rolls of unexposed film. 54 The plaintiff asserted that the disclaimer was
unconscionable and that his lack of actual notice of the disclaimer pre-
vented his assent to the exculpatory provision.'55 The court enforced
the clause, stating that the disclaimer was not unconscionable because
the parties possessed equal bargaining power and because the plaintiff
knew of the disclaimer but failed to object to its inclusion in the
agreement. 56
Presented with a similar fact pattern, the Louisiana Court of Ap-
peals reached a different result in Bowes v. Fox-Stanley Photo Prod-
ucts. 5 The plaintiffs delivered film containing images of their vacation
in Bordeaux, France to the defendant for processing.158 The defendant
accepted the film but subsequently lost it. The plaintiffs sued, demand-
ing reimbursement for the cost of their vacation and for "deprivation[]
of gratification of intellectual enjoyment in seeing the photographs and
in showing them to friends."' 5 9 The defendant claimed that a disclaimer
printed on the customer receipt limited liability to replacement of the
lost film with an equal amount of unexposed film.16 0 The plaintiffs,
however, believed that the receipt was merely a token of identification,
not a contractual disclaimer of liability.' 61 Finding the plaintiffs' belief
justified, the court held that the exculpatory term was not binding ab-
sent a showing that its contents were explained or brought to the plain-
tiffs' attention.
162
Because no single standard exists to determine when a person has a
duty to read the provisions of a contract and when that party may be
excused on the basis of "mistake," the law concerning exculpatory bail-
ment receipts is replete with uncertainty. For example, it is difficult to
test which terms of a contract the bailor assented to and which terms
are outside the scope of the bailment agreement. In "bailment receipt"
cases, one solution to the dilemma is to apply Professor Karl Llewel-
lyn's theory of mutual assent in standardized form contracts.1 3 Llewel-
154. Carr, 422 N.E.2d at 1278.
155. Carr, 441 N.E.2d at 455.
156. Id.
157. 379 So. 2d 844 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
158. Id. at 845 n.4. The customer's receipt included the following language:
The sending of exposed film to us for any purpose will constitute an agreement that if the
film is damaged or lost by us, or any subsidiary company, we may replace it with an
equivalent amount of unexposed film and that, except for such replacement the handling of
exposed film by us for any purpose is without warranty or other liability of any kind.
Id.
159. Id. at 845.
160. Id.





lyn stated that a form contract consists of two separable contracts. 64
One contract consists of the "dickered" terms, which are those terms
actually bargained for and specifically assented to by the non-drafting
party. The other contract is the "supplementary boiler-plate" contract
that encompasses the unnegotiated and probably unread terms on the
form. The non-drafting party-the bailor in most bailment cases-does
not manifest specific assent to the boiler-plate terms but assents only to
the overall agreement and to any reasonable supplementary terms that
an ordinarily prudent person might expect to find in such a transac-
tion. 165 Thus, in a bailment agreement, provisions concerning the
description, quantity, delivery and redelivery dates, price, and duration
are terms that usually are open for actual bargaining. All other provi-
sions, such as warranties and disclaimers of liability, generally are rele-
gated to the fine print for the bailor to take or leave, commonly without
knowledge of their existence. 66 Under Professor Llewellyn's analysis, a
bailor would be held only to the bargained-for provisions of the agree-
ment and to a few boiler-plate terms that are fair and consistent with
the general tenor of the transaction.
167
D. Posting Signs
A final exculpatory method employed by commercial bailees is the
posting of signs containing disclaimers of liability for the loss of or
damage to bailed property. Under the common law rule regarding
posted disclaimers, the mere presence of signs will not in itself relieve a
defendant of liability for negligence. 68 In order for the limitation to be
effective, the bailor must have actual notice of the limitation, or the
sign must be conspicuously displayed..
6 9
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize that so far as
concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically,
are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of transaction, but one thing more. That one
thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent
terms the seller [or bailee] may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasona-
ble meaning of the dickered terms.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370-71 (1960).
164. Id. at 371.
165. Id. at 370-71. See generally Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U.
PA. L. REV. 931, 933-46 (1969).
166. See Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 701 (1939); see also Booby-Trapped
by the Fine Print, 20 UCC L. LETTER, Feb. 1987, at 1 (outlining both the "healthy purposes" and
the "less savory aspects" of boiler plate language).
167. Questions remaining include whether a clause limiting the bailee's common law liability
is the type of term a reasonable person expects to find in a commercial bailment agreement and
whether such a clause is consistent with the "dickered" terms of that agreement.
168. Chalet Ford, Inc. v. Red Top Parking, Inc., 62 Ill. App. 3d 270, 275, 379 N.E.2d 88, 91
(1978).
169. See. e.g., Parking Management, Inc. v. Jacobson, 257 A.2d 479, 480 (D.C. 1969) (holding
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In Conboy v. Studio 54, Inc.1 70 the plaintiff delivered his one
month old, 1350 dollar leather jacket to the discotheque's coatroom at-
tendant. 171 The plaintiff paid seventy-five cents for this service and re-
ceived a claim ticket that did not contain any disclaimers. At the end of
the evening, the plaintiff attempted to reclaim his jacket, but it was
missing.172 The plaintiff subsequently sued the discotheque for negli-
gence, claiming damages of 1350 dollars.1 73 The discotheque asserted
that its liability was limited by a sign posted in the coatroom and stat-
ing that, liability for lost property would be limited to 100 dollars per
lost item.174 Because the plaintiff did not notice the sign and the de-
fendant failed to prove that the sign was conspicuously posted, the
court held that the plaintiff-bailor was not bound by the disclaimer of
liability.' 75
A Texas court reached a similar result in Ford v. McWilliams.'76 In
Ford the plaintiffs car was towed to the defendant's garage for repair.
After repairing the car, one of the defendant's employees parked the car
in an adjacent vacant lot with the keys left either in the ignition switch
or above the sun visor. 177 When the plaintiff returned to retrieve his car,
he discovered that it had been stolen.17" The defendant argued that two
posted signs warning that the garage was "not responsible for fire or
theft" effectively absolved it of liability for negligent loss of the bailed
car.' 9 The court held that unless the disclaimer is brought to the
bailor's attention, the mere posting of a sign generally does not limit a
bailee's liability for theft, fire, or negligence.'8 0
Nevertheless, posting signs containing disclaimers is one of the
most successful methods used by bailees to limit their liability for negli-
gence. Many courts employ a disjunctive test under which the bailor
will be denied recovery if the bailor had actual knowledge of the limita-
limitation ineffective because the bailor was unaware of the posted disclaimer); Conboy v. Studio
54, Inc., 113 Misc. 2d 403, 406, 449 N.Y.S.2d 391, 394 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982); Ford v. McWilliams,
278 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
170. 113 Misc. 2d 403, 449 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
171. Id. at 404, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 406, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
175. Id.
176. 278 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
177. Id. at 338. "It was the usual and customary practice of the [bailee] to ... leave [cars]
parked on such lot with the keys either in the ignition switch or on the sun visor.. .. This was the
customary practice of persons in the same or similar business in Pampa." Id.
178. Id.




tion or if the sign was conspicuous.18' If the bailor fails to notice the
sign, the bailee still may prevail if the sign was prominently displayed.
A few courts, however, refuse to consider the sign itself and, instead,
concentrate solely on the bailor's knowledge. 8 " Because this latter
group of courts tends to promulgate the more controversial decisions,
some observers, such as Professor Farnsworth, oppose judicial adoption
of an "actual notice" standard for recovery.183 Farnsworth recognizes
the inequity of denying recovery to a party who attempts to understand
the terms of a contract while allowing a party who remains blissfully
ignorant of the contract terms to recover.18 4 The Restatement (Second)
of Contracts addresses the problem of permitting parties who are igno-
rant of the disclaimer to recover while denying recovery to those who
are aware of the disclaimer. The Restatement (Second) maintains that
a standardized agreement should treat those similarly situated in the
same manner and should disregard their knowledge or lack of knowl-
edge of the contract terms.8 5 An arguably better approach would be for
courts to apply Professor Llewellyn's rule on standardized contracts "
under which an uninformed bailor would be held to have assented only
to those terms that were reasonable and consistent with the overall pat-
tern of the transaction. A final and more desirable solution, however,
would be for the courts to analyze bailment cases within the framework
of the Uniform Commercial Code.
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE UCC TO BAILMENT
AGREEMENTS
Certain sections of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code have
been applied to transactions not satisfying the UCC's narrow definition
of "sale."'8 7 This application is supported by UCC section 2-102, which
181. See, e.g., Chalet Ford, Inc. v. Red Top Parking, Inc., 62 111. App. 3d 270, 275, 379 N.E.2d
88, 91 (1978).
182. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
183. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 299 (1982). Farnsworth calls those that have ac-
tual knowledge of the limitation of liability "unfortunate parties." Id.
184. See id.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981).
186. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968) (applying
implied warranty section to equipment lease); Pacific Am. Leasing Corp. v. S.P.E. Bldg. Sys., Inc.,
730 P.2d 273 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that UCC Article 2 applies to computer leases); Glenn
Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184 (1975); Walter E. Heller & Co.
v. Convalescent Home of the First Church of Deliverance, 49 Ill. App. 3d 213, 365 N.E.2d 1285
(1977); Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979) (applying UCC to bail-
ment transaction). But see Morgenstern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 569 F. Supp. 474, 476 (N.D. Ohio
1983) (holding that the transaction of processing film by use of a prepaid mailer is a bailment for
services and therefore governed by the law of bailment, not the UCC); Favors v. Firestone Tire &
1988]
156 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:129
provides that "[u]nless the context otherwise requires," Article 2 shall
apply to "transactions in goods."'188 The term "transactions" is not de-
fined in the UCC; nevertheless, section 1-102(1)189 suggests that the
UCC should be liberally construed.' 90 In addition, UCC drafters have
advocated extending the UCC to other areas of the law, namely nonsale
transactions, by analogy.19' Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the
scope of Article 2192 is not restricted to sales. If Article 2 were applied
to nonsale transactions by analogy only, courts would be free to apply
or ignore Article 2 arbitrarily. The result would be to decrease predict-
ability and certainty in commercial dealings, contradicting the UCC
goal of achieving uniformity among the states in the area of commercial
transactions. 193 The solution, therefore, is to apply Article 2 to bailment
Rubber Co., 309 So. 2d 69, 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that "[t]he bailment involved in
the case. . . was not similar to a sale and we see no reason to extend Uniform Commercial Code
warranties to this type [delivery of truck to store to have tires changed] of bailment"). See gener-
ally Dusenberg & King, Sales and Bulk Transfers under the U.C.C., in 3 BENDER'S UCC SERVICES
§ 1.03[4] (1980).
188. UCC § 2-102 (1978).
189. UCC § 1-102(1) (1978). This section reads: "This Act shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies." Id.
190. See also Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981)
(indicating that the underlying purpose of the UCC is to permit commercial usage to be liberally
interpreted); Cleveland Lumber Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Ga. 1975)
(stating that the purpose of the UCC is to make commercial law uniform and predictable); A.M.
Knitwear Corp. v. All Am. Export-Import Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 14, 359 N.E.2d 342, 390 N.Y.S.2d 832
(1976) (holding that the primary purpose of the UCC is to simplify, modernize, and clarify com-
mercial law); Pacific Prods., Inc. v. Great W. Plywood, Ltd., 528 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)
(asserting that the objective of the UCC is to provide a comprehensive set of rules governing com-
mercial transactions in place of different rules established by the legislative and decisional law of
different states).
191. See Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 880, 887 (1965); see also Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1936). Chief Justice Stone encouraged courts to look to statutes for analogies in order to
achieve a more complete unification of judge-made and statutory law. Id. The draftsmen of the
Code state in their comment to the title and enacting preamble that "[tihe concept of the present
Act is that 'commercial transactions' is a single subject of the law, notwithstanding its many facets.
. . . This Act purports to deal with all phases which may ordinarily arise in the handling of a
commercial transaction, from start to finish." General Comment of National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute, UCC, 1 U.L.A. xvi-xvii. (1976).
Professors Hart and Willier advance the notion that this statement "clearly indicates that the
Code is intended to be a comprehensive embodiment of commercial law." Hart & Willier, Forms
and Procedures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, in 5 BENDER'S UCC SERVICE 12.02 (1986).
192. See Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818 (Ala. 1984) (noting that Article 2
applies to a "transaction" in goods, which is a broader category than the "sale" of goods). But cf.
Note, The Extension of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Leases of Goods, 12 TULSA
L.J. 556 (1977). Although the commentator argues that Article 2 should be extended to leases, the
commentator believes the wording "transaction in goods" in § 1-102 was an inadvertent error and
draftsmen intended to use "sale" in place of "transactions." Id. at 564-65.
193. UCC § 1-102(2)(c) states that one of the underlying policies of the UCC is "to make
uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." In addition, the General Comment of National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute states that
1988] COMMERCIAL BAILMENTS
transactions by its own force.
A. Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co.
In Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co.19 4 the Supreme Court of Washington
considered whether Article 2 could be applied to determine the effect of
a disclaimer printed on a film receipt.' The Mieske court, relying both
on section 2-102's use of the term "transaction" rather than "sale" and
its underlying bias against disclaimers, held that the UCC did apply to
the bailment transaction. Thus, the court applied Article 2 to an area
not expressly covered by the UCC. 98
In Mieske the plaintiff's wife delivered thirty-two reels of home
"uniformity throughout American jurisdictions is one of the main objectives of this code." UCC, 1
U.L.A. xv (1976). But see Taylor, Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-State Enactment:
A Confluence of Contradictions, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 337 (1978) (discussing the fact that total uni-
formity has not been realized).
194. 92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979)
195. For a discussion of this aspect of the Mieske case, see Judicial Highlight, § 2-102,
2-719(3)-Extended Application of Article 2 to Bailments-Unconscionable Limitation of Conse-
quential Damages, 12 U.C.C. L.J. 267 (1980).
196. Mieske, 92 Wash. 2d at 40, 593 P.2d at 1312 (stating that "[h]ad the drafters of the code
intended to limit article 2 to the sales they could have easily so stated").
One author concluded that the "basic question of whether article 2 extends to non-sale trans-
actions depends, in part, on whether the U.C.C. is viewed as a statute or as a code." Rodau, Com-
puter Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853, 889
(1986). Rodau continued that "if viewed as a statute, non-sale transactions generally would be
excluded from article 2 coverage while transactions might be covered by article 2 if the courts
treated the U.C.C. as a code." Id.
Professor Grant Gilmore provided the following explanation of the difference between a code
and a statute:
A "statute," . is a legislative enactment which goes as far as it goes and no further..
[W]hen a case arises which is not within the precise statutory language . . .then the court
should put the statute out of mind and reason its way to decision according to the basic
principles of the common law. A "code," . . . is a legislative enactment which entirely pre-
empts the field and which is assumed to carry within it the answers to all possible questions:
thus when a court comes to a gap or an unforeseen situation, its duty is to find, by extrapola-
tion and analogy, a solution consistent with the policy of the codifying law; the pre-Code
common law is no longer available as an authoritative source.
Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1043 (1961).
Rodau believes that the UCC is a code because "[a]n examination of the historical considera-
tions leading to the creation of the U.C.C. indicates that it was intended to produce a single uni-
form body of law to which commercial lawyers and businessmen could look to answer all
commercial questions and solve all commercial problems." Rodau, supra, at 890-91 (footnote omit-
ted). But see, e.g., Murray, The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1981) (asserting that Article 2 is a group of stat-
utes, not a true code). Rodau also notes that "[e]xpress U.C.C. language supports the view that the
U.C.C. is intended to be a true code." Id., referring to UCC § 1-104 & official comment (stating
that UCC is "intended as a uniform codification of permanent character covering an entire 'field'
of law"); see also Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291, 299-
300 (1962) (arguing that the UCC is a true code because it exhibits a systematic organization of
provisions with consistent terminology that provides a means to handle conflicting rules, fill gaps,
and mitigate harsh rules when appropriate).
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movies to the defendant's camera department for splicing.197 The film
was irreplaceable, 19 8 and the plaintiff's wife warned defendant's man-
ager, "Don't lose these. They are my life."'1 99 The manager accepted the
film and gave the plaintiff's wife a receipt, which she neither read nor
discussed with the manager. 20 0 The receipt contained a disclaimer that
provided, "[W]e assume no responsibility beyond retail cost of film un-
less otherwise agreed to in writing. 2 01 The camera shop sent the movies
to a film processing lab. While in the lab's custody, the reels of film
were negligently lost or destroyed. The plaintiff filed suit against the
camera shop, the lab, and a janitorial service employed by the lab. The
jury returned a verdict of 7500 dollars against the camera shop and the
lab.20 2 The verdict was affirmed by the state supreme court.
Defendants lab and camera shop argued that the Washington ver-
sion of UCC section 2-719(3)20s authorized a limitation of consequential
damages unless the exclusionary clause on the film receipt was uncon-
scionable.20 4 The plaintiff, however, argued that the UCC did not apply
to bailments. The court settled this debate by holding that the scope of
197. Mieske, 92 Wash. 2d at 42, 593 P.2d at 1309-10.
198. Id. at 42, 593 P.2d at 1309. The films started with the plaintiff's wedding and honey-
moon, chronicled family vacations and gatherings, and contained pictures of various family mem-
bers, including some who had passed away. Id.
199. Id. at 42, 593 P.2d at 1310.
200. Id. at 42-49, 593 P.2d at 1310, 1313 (stating, "Mrs. Mieske ... viewed the numbered
slip as merely a receipt").
201. Id. at 46, 593 P.2d at 1310.
202. Id. The award was based on the "intrinsic value" of the film to the customer but not on
"any unusual sentimental value of the film." Id. at 42-46, 593 P.2d at 1308-11.
203. Washington's amended version of § 2-719(3) provides:
Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of goods purchased
primarily for personal, family or household use or of any services related thereto is invalid
unless it is proved that the limitation is not unconscionable. Limitation of remedy to repair or
replacement of defective parts or non-conforming goods is invalid in sales of goods primarily
for personal, family, or household use unless the manufacturer or seller maintains or provides
within the state facilities adequate to provide reasonable and expeditious performance of re-
pair or replacement obligations.
Limitation of other consequential damages is valid unless it is established that the limita-
tion is unconscionable.
WASH. REv. CODE § 62A-2-719(3) (1974).
UCC § 2-719(3) states: "Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limita-
tion or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person
in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the
loss is commercial is not." UCC § 2-719(3) (1978).
The differences between the two Code versions are that: (1) the Washington version refers to
sales and purchases while the UCC does not, and (2) the Washington statute, unlike the UCC,
places the burden of proving unconscionability on the seller when the goods are for personal use
and the injury is personal. See Special Project, Recent Developments in Commercial Law, 11 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 527, 681 & n.34 (1980).
204. Mieske, 92 Wash. 2d at 46, 593 P.2d at 1311.
COMMERCIAL BAILMENTS
Article 2 encompasses transactions other than sales.2"5 Having con-
strued the scope of Article 2 to include bailments, the court next con-
sidered whether the disclaimer had been incorporated into the bailment
contract.
The defendants asserted that the UCC's recognition of "usage of
trade"20 and "course of dealing" 207 validated the exculpatory clause be-
cause the uniform trade practice of film processors imposed on custom-
ers exculpatory clauses identical or similar to the one found on the
plaintiff's receipt. 208 The existence of a trade usage, however, is a ques-
tion of fact.2 0 9 Although the Mieske defendants established that utiliza-
tion of printed exculpatory clauses was a trade usage among film
processors, the defendants could not prove that the same usage was rec-
ognized between commercial film processors and their retail custom-
ers. 21  The court held that even though other commercial film
processors printed exculpatory clauses on customer receipts, this prac-
tice was not proof that all of the defendant camera shop's customers
understood the disclaimer. 211 The court also stated that the defendants
failed to prove that the plaintiff's wife knew or should have known of
the camera shop's "trade usage" of limiting liability for negligence.
212
Thus, the defendants' reliance on the concept of trade usage did not
validate the exculpatory clause.21 3
Regarding the course of dealing, the court held that the defend-
ants' proof fell short of the express language of section 1-205(3).214 The
record revealed that the plaintiff's wife and the defendant camera
shop's manager never discussed the exculpatory clause; that the plain-
205. Id. at 47, 593 P.2d 1312.
206. Section 1-205(2) of the UCC defines usages of trade as "any practice or method of deal-
ing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation
that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." UCC § 1-205(2) (1978).
207. Section 1-205(1) of the UCC defines course of dealing as "a sequence of previous con-
duct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a
common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." UCC
§ 1-205(1) (1978).
208. Mieske, 92 Wash. 2d at 49, 593 P.2d at 1313.
209. Id.; see also Superior Foods, Inc. v. Harris-Teeter Super Markets, Inc., 288 N.C. 213,
217 S.E.2d 566 (1975) (providing that, ordinarily, the existence and scope of a usage of trade are
questions of fact); Colley v. Bi-State, Inc., 21 Wash. App. 769, 586 P.2d 908 (1978) (holding that
whether a party has produced sufficient evidence to establish a trade usage as part of a contract is
a question of fact).




214. Section 1-205(3) of the UCC reads: "A course of dealing between parties and any usage
of trade in the . . . trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware give
particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement." UCC § 1-205(3) (1978).
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tiff's wife never read the clause because she viewed the slip only as a
receipt; that the camera shop manager himself did not seem to under-
stand fully the exculpation; and that the defendants failed to show that
similar language was printed on any other receipts given in prior deal-
ings between the parties."'l Thus, the limitation of liability was not part
of the bailment contract because, based on standards enunciated in Ar-
ticle 2, a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would not have
expected that a limitation of liability for the bailee's negligence would
be part of the commercial agreement.
B. Applicable UCC Provisions
Having established that Article 2 covers bailment transactions, the
next step is to determine which sections of Article 2 should be applied.
One technique of selection is to disregard all Article 2 provisions whose
language ostensibly limits their application to sales. 18 This method is
undesirable because it detracts from the flexibility of the Code and vir-
tually limits the UCC to sales transactions. 17 An alternative method is
to apply Article 2 provisions to bailments only when "the context re-
quires." 21 s In other words, courts would apply UCC provisions only
when the case involves the same considerations that gave rise to that
provision. The official comments to the UCC offer a readily available
source for the premises and assumptions underlying each rule. UCC
sections that may readily be applied to commercial bailments include
section 2-302 ("Unconscionable Contract or Clause"), sections 2-313
through 2-316 (express and implied warranty provisions), and section 2-
719 ("Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy").21 9
215. Mieske, 92 Wash. 2d at 49, 593 P.2d at 1313.
216. See Special Project, supra note 203, at 677. On the other hand, Professors Dusenberg
and King advise that lawyers always should consider applying Article 2 principles, including those
sections that specifically refer to "sale," "seller," or "buyer," to bailments. Dusenberg & King,
supra note 187, § 1.0314], at 1-37.
217. According to Professor Rodau,
A careful reading on the entire text of article 2 indicates that only ten sections fail, at least in
part, to explicitly mention "sale," "buyer," or "seller." However, seven of these sections refer
either directly or indirectly to "contracts" or "agreements" which are defined by section 2-106
to refer to contracts or agreements for the present or future sale of goods. Consequently only
three sections in article 2 are not explicitly limited to the sale of goods..
Rodau, supra note 196, at 893.
218. See UCC § 2-102 (1978). One commentator warned that application of the UCC to situ-
ations beyond its express terms must be tempered with caution in order to avoid inappropriate
application of the UCC. Note, supra note 191, at 888.
219. These sections do not compose an exclusive list of the UCC provisions that may be
applied to bailment transactions; they simply are a sampling of sections that may most commonly
be applied to bailment transactions.
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1. Section 2-302: Unconscionability
Section 2-302, which deals with the concept of unconscionability, is
not expressly limited to sales. This section speaks of "contract" and
"clause of contract," and provides that a court may strike an uncon-
scionable clause from an agreement or void as unconscionable the con-
tract as a whole.220 The word "sale," however, does not appear in
section 2-302, nor do any of its derivatives such as "seller.1221 Near the
end of the Mieske opinion, the Supreme Court of Washington ad-
dressed the issue of unconscionability, noting that section 2-302 neither
defines nor sets forth specific examples of unconscionable conduct. An
unconscionability defense is, however, an important remedy whenever
an unsophisticated buyer signs a contract. This remedy allows a buyer,
after discovering a seller's unfair practice, to request the court to invali-
date the exculpatory clause if the buyer (or bailor) can prove that the
clause was grossly unfair or oppressive and that the buyer (or bailor)
was surprised by the legal effect of the clause.222 In Mieske the appel-
late court agreed with the trial court's finding that the disclaimer was
unconscionable. Although the court failed to elaborate on the subject,
the court did suggest that section 2-302 may be applied to bailment
transactions.
2 23
Even though the adoption of UCC section 2-302 in the bailment
context would not necessarily provide courts with a single definition of
"unconscionability,1 2 4 application of the section would provide courts
with a body of interpretive case law to guide their decisionmaking pro-
cess.225 The value of this UCC provision is illustrated in Fotomat Corp.
220. See UCC § 2-302 (1978); see also Rodau, supra note 196, at 393 & n.165.
221. See UCC § 2-302 (1978).
222. G. WALLACH, THE LAW OF SALES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 5.06 (1981).
A detailed discussion of § 2-302 is outside the scope of this Note. For in depth discussions of
unconscionability, see Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Spanogle, supra note 165.
223. See Mieske, 92 Wash. 2d at 49, 593 P.2d at 1313-14. For a detailed discussion of Mieske,
see supra text accompanying notes 194-215.
224. See Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976) (stating that
the UCC does not define unconscionability).
225. Id. While the UCC neither defines the concept of unconscionability nor provides the
elements or parameters of the doctrine, courts have identified a number of factors that aid them in
determining the applicability of the doctrine of unconscionability to a given fact situation. These
factors include:
(1) the use of printed forms or boilerplate contracts drawn by the party in the stronger eco-
nomic position which establish industry-wide standards on a "take it or leave it" basis to the
party in a weaker economic position;
(2) a significant cost-price disparity or excessive price;
(3) a denial of basic rights and remedies to a buyer of consumer goods;
(4) the inclusion of penalty clauses;
(5) the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract, including its commercial set-
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v. Chanda.26 In Chanda a Florida district court reversed a 9500 dollar
award for loss of home movies that the plaintiff had entrusted to the
defendant film processor. 2 7 The defendant's order form contained a
clause disclaiming liability for any damages beyond the actual cost of
the unexposed film. 228 The plaintiff was a medical doctor and was ex-
perienced in business transactions. He read the limitation clause, ques-
tioned the clerk about it, and then signed the receipt, approving the
transaction.2 29 After considering Florida's version of UCC section 2-
302,230 and cases decided under UCC section 2-302,31 the court held
that the limitation of liability provision was not unconscionable.3 2 The
court adopted the view that two elements-substantive unconscionabil-
ting, its purpose and its actual effect;
(6) the hiding of disadvantageous clauses in a mass of fine print or in places that are incon-
spicuous to the party signing the contract;
(7) phrasing clauses in language that is incomprehensible to a layman or that divert his atten-
tion from the problems raised by them or by the rights given up through them;
(8) an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights imposed by the bargain;
(9) exploitation of the underprivileged, unsophisticated, uneducated and illiterate; and
(10) inequality of bargaining or economic power.
Id.; see also Discount Fabric House of Racine, Inc. v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 113 Wis. 2d 258, 334
N.W.2d 922 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that while UCC § 2-302 deals primarily with contracts
for the sale of goods, the draftsmens' comments provide insight into the appropriate use of the
unconscionability doctrine in other contexts), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Wis. 2d 587, 345 N.W.2d
417 (1984); UCC § 2-302 official comment (1978).
226. 464 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
227. Id. at 627. The plaintiff delivered 28 rolls of movie film to defendant after reading a
magazine article indicating that the deterioration of the film could be avoided by transferring the
images on the film to videotape and a flyer distributed by the defendant that advertised the availa-
bility of this service. Id. The films were of great sentimental value to the plaintiff because they
contained depictions of his honeymoon, graduation from medical school, son's birth, and various
other family activities. Id. at 627-28.
228. Id. at 627. The disclaimer read:
IMPORTANT
THE WARRANTY BELOW GIVES YOU SPECIFIC LEGAL RIGHTS AND LIMITA-
TIONS. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. By depositing film or other material with Foto-
mat, customer acknowledges and agrees that Fotomat's liability for any loss, damage, or delay
to film during the processing service will be limited to the replacement cost of a non-exposed
roll of film and/or blank cassette of similar size. Except for such replacement, Fotomat shall
not be liable for any other loss or damage direct, consequential, or incidental, arising out of




230. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.302 (West 1980). "This is section 2-302 of the 1962 Official
Text without change." Id. at Florida Code Comments.
231. Cases cited in Chanda include (in the order cited): Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Kohl v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 398 So. 2d
865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Johnson v. Mobile Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
232. Chanda, 464 So. 2d at 631. The case was remanded to the trial court with directions to
enter judgment in favor of plaintiff for the "cost of 28 rolls of unexposed Super-8 movie film." Id.
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ity 23 3 and procedural unconscionability23 -must coalesce before a dis-
claimer will be invalidated. The Chanda court held that the plaintiff
did not prove either prong of the UCC unconscionability test.
The limitation clause in Chanda was not substantively unconscion-
able because it was reasonable under the circumstances. The defendant
presented unrebutted testimony that similar exculpatory clauses were
standard in the industry. Although loss or destruction of film is rela-
tively infrequent in view of the tremendous amount of film handled,
film processors are unwilling to expose themselves to unlimited liability
for the unknown value of the film's contents without greatly increasing
the price of their services.2"5 If the customer is aware of the exculpatory
clause and if there is a commercial need for the clause, courts hesitate
to label the clause as substantively unconscionable.2 36
The plaintiff did not satisfy the procedural prong of the unconscio-
nability test because he read and understood the exculpatory clause but
proceeded with the transaction anyway. 37 Although the plaintiff was
not given an opportunity to negotiate the terms of the agreement, he
never attempted to ascertain whether any other processors would pro-
vide the same service without disclaiming liability.2 3 s The official com-
ment to UCC section 2-302 states that one principle embodied in the
provision is "the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise . . . and
not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
power. '23 9 In Chanda there were no traces of oppression or undue
240surprise.
233. "A case is made out for substantive unconscionability by alleging and proving that the
terms of the contract are unreasonable and unfair." Id. at 629 (citing Kohl, 398 So. 2d at 868).
234. "Procedural unconscionability. . . speaks to the individualized circumstances surround-
ing each contracting party at the time the contract was entered into." Chanda, 464 So. 2d at 629
(citing Kohl, 398 So. 2d at 868). See generally J. WIrTE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 118-30 (2d ed. 1980).
235. Chanda, 464 So. 2d at 630.
236. Id. at 631. The court noted that the reasonableness of the clause was demonstrated by
the huge loss claimed by the plaintiff, compared to the cost of the service. The charge for the
processing service was $31.00. The videocassette cost $18.95. The plaintiff claimed $9500 in dam-
ages. Id. at 630-31.
237. Id. at 631.
238. Id.
239. UCC § 2-302 official comment (1978).
240. Chanda, 464 So. 2d at 631. The court discussed and distinguished the Mieske case:
Although the [Mieske] scenario . . . is much like the one here, there is one very salient and
important distinction. In Mieske, the plaintiff's wife, who brought the already developed film
to the drug store for splicing . . ., was given a receipt for the film which contained a brief
limitation of liability clause. It was not called to her attention nor discussed, she was not
aware of it, and she had no prior experience with or knowledge of any custom of the
trade. ...
Id. In Chanda the plaintiff "saw and read the clause in question, asked a question about it and was
apparently satisfied with the answer because he signed it. He had previously suffered the loss of
19881
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2. Sections 2-313 Through 2-316: The Warranty Provisions
The Article 2 warranty sections contain language referring to
sales, 4 but courts have not been willing to apply these provisions to
nonsale transactions. 42 One factor supporting this application is the
UCC drafters' proposal that the policies underlying express sales war-
ranties be adopted as guidance to courts dealing with bailments-
for-hire. 43 A bailment differs from a sale in that a sale transfers owner-
ship of an item in exchange for a given price, while a bailment merely
transfers possession and contemplates the eventual return of the item
to the bailor. Bailments, however, do resemble sales in several respects:
both involve transactions in property, both require a transfer of posses-
sion, and both require some form of consideration. Moreover, lay per-
sons often fail to distinguish between commercial bailees and sellers.
This confusion is due partially to the fact that some businessmen act as
both bailee and seller. A jeweler, for example, sells merchandise as a
seller and accepts items for repair as a bailee. Additionally, warranty
problems in both types of transactions tend to arise under similar cir-
cumstances; for example, both sellers and bailees insert warranties or
general disclaimer provisions into standardized form contracts. 4 These
similarities indicate that the application of Article 2 warranty provi-
sions is appropriate in the bailment context. If application of the war-
ranty provisions were extended to bailments, bailees would be able to
limit their liability for negligence, but this exculpation would have to
film at a different place of business, and it had been replaced by new film." Id.
241. See UCC §§ 2-313 (stating that "[e]xpress warranties by the seller are created as fol-
lows" (emphasis added)), 2-314 (stating that "[u]nless excluded or modified . . . a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant"
(emphasis added)), 2-315 (indicating that "[w]here the seller at the time of contracting has reason
to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that buyer is relying on the
seller's skill . . . there is . . . an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose"
(emphasis added)), and 2-316 (observing that "when the buyer before entering into the contract"
(emphasis added)).
242. See, e.g., United States Welding v. Burroughs Corp., 587 F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1984)
(assuming, without discussion, that Article 2 warranty provisions were applicable to a transaction
involving the lease of computer hardware and operating software); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing
Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 954, 428 S.W.2d 46, 54 (1968) (holding that the state version of § 2-316(2) "is
applicable to leases where the provisions of the lease are analogous to a sale" (emphasis in origi-
nal)); Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184 (1975) (holding
that UCC §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315, and 2-316 should be extended to the lease transaction in ques-
tion); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Convalescent Home of the First Church of Deliverance, 49 Ill. App.
3d 213, 365 N.E.2d 1285 (1977) (applying the state version of § 2-316(2) to an equipment lease by
analogy).
243. UCC § 2-313 comment 2 (1978).
244. For a detailed discussion of warranty law, see Sullivan, Innovation in the Law of War-
ranty: The Burden of Reform, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 341 (1980). See id. at 381-82 for a discussion of
disclaimers and standardized contracts.
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(1) be presented to the bailor in writing, (2) be conspicuous, and (3)
specifically mention negligence.2 45 A disclaimer in fine print on an in-
conspicuous sign or on the back of a receipt probably will not fulfill the
UCC "conspicuousness" requirement.
2 ,6
Few courts have addressed the precise question of whether Article
2 sales warranties are applicable to bailments; rather, most cases on the
subject have applied sales warranties to bailments by analogy. 24 7 One
court, for example, held that section 2-316(2), pertaining to disclaimer
of warranties, could be applied to a bailment transaction because the
section reflected state public policy regarding disclaimers of warranty
liability in commercial transactions.248 On the other hand, some courts
have indicated that nonsale transactions, such as bailments and chattel
leases, are not within the purview of Article 2, and at least one court
expressly refused to apply sales warranties to bailments even by anal-
ogy. 24' In Bona v. Graefe 2 °1the court stated that warranties in nonsale
245. UCC § 2-316 (1978); see also supra text accompanying notes 80-96 (discussing whether
an exculpatory clause must contain the term "negligence"). But cf. The Fine Art of Disclaiming
Liability, 14 U.C.C. L. La'rrs, Jan. 1981, at 1, 2 (noting that Code sections such as 2-316 have not
prevented the use of deceptive exculpatory techniques but merely "cause the game to be played on
a different level"; the new effort "is to come up with language of limitation that conforms to the
technical requirements of the ground rules but . . . does not present itself too clearly as a
limitation").
246. For "conspicuousness" cases decided under the UCC, see, e.g., Holcomb v. Cessna Air-
craft Co., 439 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir.) (holding that the purported disclaimer of warranties was not
"conspicuous" where it was printed in the same type as the rest of the warranty form), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 827 (1971); Kennedy Elec. Co. v. Moore-Handley, Inc., 437 So. 2d 76 (Ala. 1983)
(holding that conditions printed in red on the back of a sales quotation were conspicuous and thus
effective to limit the seller's liability); De Lamar Motor Co. v. White, 249 Ark. 708, 460 S.W.2d 802
(1970) (asserting that a disclaimer of warranties in a conditional sales contract was ineffective
because it was in smaller and lighter type than the rest of the printed form, although in italics, and
hence was not "conspicuous"); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 114 (1982) (holding that a disclaimer printed in boldface type twice as large as the other
terms of the agreement was "conspicuous"); Willis v. West Ky. Feeder Pig Co., 132 Ill. App. 2d
266, 265 N.E.2d 899 (1971) (ruling that the seller's disclaimer of warranties printed in bold type on
the invoice under a heading in capitals and heavier type was sufficiently prominent on the instru-
ment to effectively exclude implied warranties); Koperski v. Husker Dodge, Inc., 208 Neb. 29, 302
N.W.2d 655 (1981) (noting that a disclaimer of warranties printed in contrasting red print on a
purchase order was sufficiently "conspicuous" to satisfy § 2-316(2)); Commercial Credit Corp. v.
CYC Realty, Inc., 102 A.D.2d 970, 477 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1984) (holding that the test of conspicuous-
ness under § 2-316(2) is whether a reasonable person would notice the disclaimer when its type is
juxtaposed against the rest of the agreement); Frazier v. Consolidated Equip. Sales, Inc., 64 Or.
App. 833, 670 P.2d 153 (1983) (indicating that a warranty disclaimer on the back of a sales con-
tract was not in larger type than the rest of the print on the page and was thus inconspicuous).
247. See generally Annotation, Application of Warranty Provisions of Uniform Commercial
Code to Bailments, 48 A.L.R.3d 668 (1973).
248. Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971).
249. See Annotation, supra note 247, at 674-75, and cases cited therein.
250. 264 Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972).
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transactions are governed by case law, not by the UCC. 51 The court
clarified its position by stating (1) that if the UCC drafters had in-
tended the warranty provisions to apply to bailments in addition to
sales, they would have so provided and (2) that a court's extension of
the scope of the UCC amounts to judicial legislation.252
In contrast to Bona, the court in Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp.
v. Transportation Credit Clearing House2 53 held that section 2-316(2)
was directly applicable to a chattel lease.254 The Hertz court denied
summary judgment to a lessor who sued a lessee when the lessee de-
faulted on equipment lease rental payments. The lessee argued that it
ceased payments when the leased machine broke and the lessor failed
to repair it. The lessee also claimed that the lessor breached express
and implied warranties of merchantability and of fitness for the partic-
ular use of the machine intended by lessee.255 The lease agreement,
printed on a standard pre-printed form, provided in part that the lessor
made no representation, express or implied, regarding the equipment's
suitability.256 The court held that the validity of a disclaimer of warran-
ties must be tested in light of section 2-316.57 Announcing that the
warranty did not satisfy the conspicuousness requirement of UCC sec-
tion 2-316, the court noted that under section 2-102, Article 2 applies to
"transactions in goods," a category that encompasses a far wider area bf
commercial activity than a "sale.
'25 8
The primary advantage of applying UCC provisions to bailment
contracts is that under Article 2 an effective disclaimer of implied or
251. Accord Mays v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 132 Ga. App. 602, 208 S.E.2d 614 (1974)
(holding that the UCC warranty provisions were not applicable to a lease of an automobile because
the lease was not sufficiently analogous to a sale), overruled by Mock v. Canterbury Realty Co., 152
Ga. App. 879, 264 S.E.2d 494 (1980); W. R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979) (holding that Article 2 was applicable to a sale of software but inapplicable to a
lease of hardware).
Professor Rodau insists that the reason the Bona court refused to apply the Article 2 warranty
sections to the golf cart lease is that the court treated Article 2 as a statute rather than a code.
Rodau, supra note 196, at 896; see also supra note 196 (discussing the difference between "code"
and "statute").
252. 264 Md. at 73, 285 A.2d at 609.
253. 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc.
2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (N.Y. App. Term. 1970).
254. Id. at 228, 298 N.Y.S. 2d at 394.
According to Professor Rodau, Hertz "recognized that the failure to expressly include leases in
article 2 was a gap in article 2. The court looked to the underlying policy of article 2 to bridge the
gap rather than simply dismissing the code as inapplicable." Rodau, supra note 196, at 897. In
other words, the Hertz court treated the UCC as a "code" rather than a "statute." See supra notes
196 and 251.
255. 59 Misc. 2d at 227, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
256. Id. at 228, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 230, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
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express warranties must comply with fixed requirements directed at
consistency of language and protection from surprise. The warranty
provisions of Article 2 attempt to equalize the standing of the con-
tracting parties by enforcing the warranty liability of "sellers" and by
allowing "sellers" to disclaim that liability only after complying with
the specific Code requirements.2 59 The development of warranty law in
nonsale transactions has not been as extensive as in sales transactions.
Because the warranty law applicable to bailment and chattel lease
transactions has not yet attained statutory form, it presently lacks
many of the advances found in the warranty law of sales under the
UCC.2 60 Instead of waiting for the promulgation of a "Uniform Bail-
ment Code"-which does not appear to be a likely development in the
near future-courts should look to the UCC for guidance in bailment
warranty cases, especially because the Code itself invites them to do
SO.261
3. Section 2-719: Conspicuousness
Section 2-719(3), like section 2-302, is not expressly limited to
sales. Section 2-719(3) has been applied in various nonsale cases262 and
permits the parties to agree on an exclusion of consequential damages
unless the limitation is unconscionable.263 In Office Supply Co., Inc. v.
Basic/Four Corp.2 64 a federal district court analyzed section 2-719(3) in
the context of a computer software lease.26 5 The plaintiff purchased
259. See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
260. One important advancement concerns the treatment of implied warranty of fitness dis-
claimers. Under the common law a written disclaimer of the implied warranty of fitness did not
have to be prominently displayed to be effective, see General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Shea, 187
Ark. 568, 575-76, 61 S.W.2d 430, 433-34 (1933), but under the UCC these disclaimers must be
conspicuous. See UCC § 2-316 (1978).
In 1987 the final draft of Article 2A of the UCC was published by the American Law Institute.
The new article, entitled "Uniform Commercial Code-Leases," applies to chattle and equipment
leases. See UCC, 1A U.L.A. (Supp. 1987). To date, no state legislature has adopted Article 2A.
261. See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979) (section 2-
719(3) applied in bailment context); see also Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d
405 (1971) (section 2-719(3) applied to disclaimer of liability in golf cart lease).
263. For a good comparison of § 2-719(3) and § 2-316, see Dusenberg & King, supra note 187,
§ 7.03[2].
One interesting point about § 2-719(3) is that by permitting any limitation of consequential
damages, a conscionability standard is imposed. Thus, the application of § 2-719(3) hinges on the
application of § 2-302, the UCC's unconscionability provision. See supra notes 220-22.
264. 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
265. For a general debate concerning whether UCC Article 2 applies to computer software
leases, compare Rodau, supra note 196 (advocating application of the UCC to software leases) with
Note, The Warranty of Merchantibility and Computer Software Contracts: A Square Peg Won't
Fit in a Round Hole, 59 WASH. L. REv. 511 (1984) (rejecting application of the UCC to software
leases).
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hardware and leased software from the defendant computer manufac-
turer to handle order processing, inventory control, sales analysis, and
accounts receivable data. The plaintiff later sued the defendant for
damages because the system allegedly was defective and caused the
plaintiff to suffer "substantial losses. "266 The contract stipulated that
the defendant's liability was limited to making repairs and excluded lia-
bility for consequential and incidental damages.67 The court held that
the disclaimers were not unconscionable,26 8 primarily because the plain-
tiff failed to meet its burden of proof.26 9 The court, however, did indi-
cate that the result might have been different had the plaintiff shown a
gross disparity in bargaining power between the parties or if the de-
fendant had exerted undue influence to compel the plaintiff to enter
into the contract. 7 0 Thus, section 2-719(3) would provide courts ad-
dressing the validity of disclaimers of liability in bailment cases with a
ready source of law on which to base their decisions. This section, along
with the other UCC provisions discussed elsewhere in this Note, would
give the courts clear standards and numerous examples the application
of which would result in more consistent rulings in cases involving ex-
culpatory clauses.
V. INSURANCE: THE BAILOR'S REMEDY
One way for a bailor to protect itself against loss of or damage to
its property by a negligent bailee is to obtain insurance. Because both
the bailor and the bailee have an insurable interest in the bailed prop-
erty,2 1 they may agree expressly that one party is responsible for pro-
curing full insurance for the benefit of both.2  They may require, for
266. Office Supply, 538 F. Supp. at 778. The plaintiff sought damages for "lost customers,
income, good will and executive time and incurred additional hardware and software expenses,
office form expense, personnel expense and maintenance expense, all to its damage ... of $186,000
plus reasonable interest." Id. (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
267. For the content of the disclaimers, see id. at 779-80.
268. Id. at 788. "The exclusion is presumed valid in a commercial setting." Id.
269. Id. The plaintiff bore the burden of proving that the exclusion of incidental and conse-
quential damages was unconscionable. Id.
The court also based its finding on the fact that the plaintiff's president was accustomed to
engaging in contract negotiation, that the plaintiff instituted negotiations with the defendant and
engaged in a two-month period of "comparative shopping," that the defendant was not the only
source of the product in question, and that the plaintiff took its time in deciding to purchase and
was not prevented by the defendant from thoroughly investigating the computer system and the
contract provisions. Id. at 789.
270. Id.
271. For cases holding that a bailee has an insurable interest in bailed property in his posses-
sion, see, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 437 F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1971); Key-
stone Fabric Laminates, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 407 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir. 1969); Cumis Ins. Soc'y,
Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 480 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
272. See, e.g., Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Foss Launch & Tug Co., 560 P.2d 393 (Alaska 1977)
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example, that the bailor insure the bailed property in order to eliminate
duplicate coverage and to reduce bailment costs. Courts have affirmed
the validity of a condition obligating the bailor to purchase insurance,
holding that because the bailee could have contracted directly with an
insurance company for coverage, the bailee could contract with the
bailor for the bailor's procurement of insurance.2 73 A condition requir-
ing the bailor to obtain insurance relieves the bailee from liability for
its own negligence only to the extent that the bailor's loss is covered by
the insurance.274
Although bailors may want to consider procuring insurance even
when not required by the contract, the cost is often prohibitive. For
example, photographers may obtain "reshoot insurance" on a very lim-
ited basis for a very high price.7 5 Some insurance companies charge
between 1000 and 6000 dollars a year to insure the film of professional
advertising photographers whose expenses can be determined easily and
whose work can be duplicated.276 A better solution from the bailor's
point of view is to require the bailee to procure insurance covering the
bailed property.
Generally, a bailee has no obligation to insure the bailed property
for the benefit of the bailor.277 In certain circumstances, however, a
number of specific factors may have the effect of imposing on a bailee
the duty to insure the bailed property. 278 These factors include a gov-
k
(holding that storage agreement made bailor responsible for insurance for benefit of bailor and
bailee).
273. See id. at 396. See generally Annotation, Bailee's Liability as Affected by Bailment
Condition That Bailor Procure Insurance, 83 A.L.R.3d 519, 522 (1978).
274. See Buckey v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 234 Minn. 379, 48 N.W.2d 534 (1951).
The court stated:
[I]t does not follow that an agreement by a bailor to give a bailee the benefit of the bailor's
insurance is equivalent to a contract freeing the bailee from responsibility for his own negli-
gence. In such cases, the bailee is still held fully responsible for the consequences of his negli-
gence, the only difference being that his liability is limited to the extent that the bailor is
compensated by insurance carried in accordance with the agreement between the parties.
Id. at 384, 48 N.W.2d at 537.
275. Hughey, supra note 151.
On the other hand, the bailor's loss may be covered by a standard homeowner's insurance
policy. Thus, the bailor would not have to pay an additional premium. The bailor should, however,
contract to have the bailee pay the deductible in case of any loss.
276. Id. The price of such policies is usually based on the photographer's billable expenses.
Id.
277. See generally Annotation, Bailee's Duty to Insure Property, 28 A.L.R.3d 513 (1969).
278. See Bank of Monango v. Ellendale Nat'l Bank, 52 N.D. 8, 201 N.W. 839 (1924) (holding
that the general obligation of a bailee to exercise ordinary diligence and reasonable care may,
independent of any specific factor requiring him to do so, impose upon him a duty to insure the
bailed property). See generally J. APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4509 (W. Berdal ed.
1979); Booth, Bailee Losses, 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 304 (1956); Annotation, supra note 277.
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erning statute,279 the bailor's instructions,1s° a course of dealing be-
tween the parties,28' and custom in the trade or industry.282 When a
bailee is under a duty to insure the bailed property for any of these
reasons, the bailee must insure the goods for their full value. 2 3 Regard-
less of who insures the property, this policy coverage will compensate
the bailor for at least actual property loss, if not for the bailor's time
and attorney's fees.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the laws vary among and even within jurisdictions, no sin-
gle answer exists to the question of whether a commercial bailee may
limit its liability for negligence. The best advice for bailors is to exercise
special care when entering into a bailment agreement. The bailor
should read signs, receipts, and, of course, any contract the bailor signs.
The bailor also should question the bailee about the bailee's policies
concerning loss of or damage to the bailed property. If the bailee insists
on limiting its liability for negligence, the bailor should search for bail-
ees who provide similar services without limiting their liability. If a
bailee places a ceiling on the amount that the bailor can be compen-
sated for loss of or damage to the bailed property, the bailor either
should demand that the bailee agree in writing to increase the bailee's
responsibility or should insure the item for the remaining amount
279. See, e.g., Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391 (1894) (upholding a state statute regulat-
ing grain warehousemen to insure the grain of bailors); Ayres v. Crowley, 205 S.C. 51, 30 S.E.2d
785 (1944) (imposing duty to insure upon warehousemen storing cotton waste products).
280. See, e.g., Bell v. Fitz, 84 Ga. App. 220, 66 S.E.2d 108 (1951) (holding that the bailee had
a duty to insure household goods when bailor had instructed him to do so and had paid six dollars
in insurance charges).
281. See, e.g., Rice Oil Co. v. Atlas Assurance Co., 102 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1939) (holding that
a course of dealing between the parties established the bailee's duty to insure). But see Insurance
Co. of N. Am. v. Krieck Furriers, Inc., 36 Wis. 2d 563, 153 N.W.2d 532 (1967) (holding that a
course of dealing between the parties established that the bailee had no duty to insure).
282. See, e.g., Coffeen v. Doster, 161 Ga. App. 529, 288 S.E.2d 327 (1982) (holding that, in a
suit for alleged negligence in safeguarding bailed jewelry, ample evidence existed to support a jury
charge explaining that a custom in the jewelry trade required a bailee to maintain insurance cover-
age on all bailed property).
One other reason the bailee should be required to obtain insurance is that the bailee is in the
best position to explain its operating procedure to the insurance company and therefore may more
easily describe the risk and negotiate the premium.
283. See, e.g., Rice Oil Co. v. Atlas Assurance Co., 102 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1939).
There is a split of authority on the issue of whether a bailor has a right to maintain a direct
action against his bailee's insurer. Generally, a stranger to a contract may not enforce it. The
concept of a third party beneficiary, however, is an exception to the general rule and permits a
person to enforce, in his own name, a contract made by another for his benefit. The words of the
particular policy play a significant role in answering this question. See Booth, supra note 278, at
304; Annotation, Bailor's Right of Direct Action Against Bailee's Theft Insurer for Loss of Bailed
Property, 64 A.L.R.3d 1207 (1975).
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before delivering the item to the bailee. Of course, people frequently
enter bailment agreements in a hurry-for example, dropping off laun-
dry at the dry cleaner when already late for work-without thinking of
questioning a bailee about disclaimers of liability. Even when a bailor
signs a written agreement, the bailor often fails to read and understand
the contractual provisions. Thus, bailees continue to attempt to limit or
exclude their liability for negligence, bailors continue to sue for lost or
damaged goods, and the courts continue to issue inconsistent and con-
flicting opinions.
One step toward clarifying bailment law is to apply directly certain
sections of UCC Article 2 to commercial bailment transactions. Al-
though the UCC is not a cure-all and may not resolve all bailment con-
troversies, it will help bailment law to adapt to a rapidly changing
commercial world. When used in the bailment context, Article 2 provi-
sions should be applied in accordance with the purposes underlying the
adoption of the UCC.284 One such purpose was to simplify, clarify, and
modernize the law governing commercial transactions.285 Another was
to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through cus-
tom, usage, and agreement of the parties. 88 Finally, the UCC was
adopted to provide a degree of uniformity in the law among the various
states. 2817 Although these purposes are stated in general terms, their im-
pact can be quite specific. For example, Article 2 warranty provisions
and the case law interpreting them detail when warranty exemptions
are allowed and prohibited. Thus, judges who must determine the valid-
ity of a particular provision may look to UCC precedent to aid the
court's decisionmaking. The UCC recognizes that a true system of uni-
formity cannot be attained if decisions are based on literalism and for-
mality;288 a truly uniform system may be established and maintained
only by examining and understanding the Code's underlying policies.
284. UCC § 1-102 (1978).
285. UCC § 1-102(2)(a) (1978). Professors Hart and Willier note that "[t]his purpose and
policy of the Code means simply that courts are to construe its provisions in a way which facili-
tates rather than complicates commercial transactions." Hart & Willier, supra note 191,
12.03[2](a].
286. UCC § 1-102(2)(b) (1978).
287. UCC § 1-102(2)(c) (1978). According to Hart and WiUier:
The moral for courts and counsel is that they should take heed of the voluminous legislative
history and analyses and, perhaps more importantly, of the decisions from other states con-
struing and applying provisions of the Code. Before reaching an opposite or different conclu-
sion from that of a court in another jurisdiction, a court should be convinced of its own
position and should be careful to explain the reasons for the variance.. .. Uncertain guide-
lines for future commercial conduct breed litigation.
Hart & Willier, supra note 191, 12.03[2][c].
288. See UCC § 1-102 (1) (1978) (stating that "[t]his Act shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies"); see also id. comment 1.
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Based on the number of states that have adopted the UCC,2' 8 the Code
has succeeded in outlining acceptable policies concerning the conduct of
commercial transactions.
Applying "sales" law to bailments does not contradict the notion
that bailment is a distinct legal concept that should be examined and
studied in its own right. On the contrary, applying portions of the UCC
to bailment agreements could help to strengthen the concept by ridding
bailment of some of its "obsolete formalities"2 90 and by facilitating the
use of interstate bailment transactions through greater predictability in
the law. The need for uniformity in bailment law is especially impor-
tant today because many businesses operate in national markets. More-
over, busy lawyers need a relatively simple and quickly available source
of law for those bailment cases in which the amount in controversy can-
not justify hours of research and analysis of conflicting case law. In ad-
dition, the application of particular UCC sections may prompt judges to
decide cases forthrightly rather than twisting the law to reach the de-
sired result or refusing to rule because of a lack of clear authority to
support a position. In short, Article 2 of the UCC would fill a large gap
and should be interpreted to cover certain nonsale transactions, specifi-
cally commercial bailments.
A. Darby Dickerson
289. The UCC has been adopted in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin
Islands. UCC Table 1 (1978).
290. Note, supra note 191, at 887. "[M]any of the principles developed in the article on sales
of goods may be utilized in renovating other areas such as . . .bailments for hire . . . which are
still encumbered with obsolete formalities." Id.
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